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Abstract
This Article analyzes the practice of allowing jurors to question wit-
nesses. Specifically, the author uses statistical research and relevant,
appellate case law to examine the advantages and disadvantages ofthis
practice. Additionally, the author discusses the extent to which jury ques-
tioning is actually used, or not, and the reasons that may explain it. An
appendix to the Article provides a jurisdictional breakdown outlining
whether thepractice ofallowingjurors to question witnesses ispermitted
and ifso whether the practice is mandatory or at the judge's discretion.
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Introduction
The defendant testified that he and his young victim went to Taco Bell
before he allegedly molested her at his home. His testimony was that he had
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expected his daughter, traveling separately, to join them there for a
sleepover. The juror wanted to know what the defendant ordered at the
restaurant. I asked the question, prompting laughter in the courtroom, but
the juror was smarter than all of us-he wanted to know how many meals
(two or three?) the defendant ordered.'
If a juror is unclear as to a point in the proof, it makes good common sense
to allow a question to be asked about i . If nothing else, the question should
alert trial counsel that a particular factual issue may need more extensive
development. Trials exist to develop truth. It may sometimes be that counsel
are so familiar with a case that they fail to see problems that would naturally
bother a juror who is presented with the facts for the first time.2
The lawyers spent three years thoroughly litigating every aspect of
the substantial personal injury case, followed by three weeks preparing
for trial. For the key witness who would likely tip the scales one way
or the other, they prepared, edited, and re-edited their questions. At trial,
counsel spent a total of ten hours on their direct, cross, and re-direct
examinations. When they sat down they silently disagreed on who scored
the more telling points, but they agreed on one thing-they had asked
all the questions that mattered. They were wrong. And, they were wrong
about one other thing. They incorrectly assumed that the jurors they saw
occasionally writing during the witness's testimony were writing only
notes.
Just moments after the jurors heard, for the third time with this wit-
ness, "No further questions, your honor," four raised their hands. Each
held a piece of paper, unsigned, with at least one question on it. They
wanted answers to questions that had not been asked by counsel, or not
well enough. They had at least the right to ask questions of witnesses,
and at most the right to have them answered.3To the likely dismay of
counsel,4 the jury wanted to take the podium.
Timothy G. Hicks, The Jury Reform Pilot Project-The Envelope, Please, MICH.
B.J., June 2011, at 40-41.
2 United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
826 (1979).
' Jurors are subject to the same evidentiary rules that bind counsel in most of the
United States; see discussion infra Part I and Appendix I.
4 See discussion infra Parts III & IV.
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These hypothetical jurors are emblematic of those who no longer are
willing to sit in monk-like silence for days or weeks, or in rare instances
months-never speaking afterjury selection except during deliberations
with questions for the court or after deliberations to announce either their
verdict or that they are deadlocked. They want to actively participate
throughout he trial by asking questions of witnesses, not just at its end.
As a result, trial counsel must now share their heretofore total control of
this crucial component of thejury trial because a second set of inquisitors
have taken their place in the courtroom.
Although there is sporadic evidence that the practice ofjury question-
ing existed in America as early as 1825' and at other times in the distant
past,6 the extent to which jury questioning is now permitted and the speed
with which it has recently occurred,7 warrants describing this as a
revolutionary development.8 It is in its own way as revolutionary a
' Eugene A. Lucci, The Case for Allowing Jurors to Submit Written Questions,
JUDICATURE, July-Aug. 2005, at 16 (citing Barry A. Cappello & James G. Strenio,
Juror Questioning: The Verdict Is in, 36 TRIAL 44 (2000)).
6 See, e.g., Stephen R. Kaufmann & Michael P. Murphy, Juror Questions During
Trial: An Idea Whose Time Has Come Again, 99 ILL. B.J. 294 (2011) (describing a
juror's question in People v. Harrison, an Illinois case in which Abraham Lincoln
defended a young man accused of murder and Lincoln did not object to the question).
' In 1993, it was noted that "no court rules have been found that forbid, authorize,
or regulate the procedure [of jury questioning]." B. Michael Dann, "Learning Les-
sons " and "Speaking Rights ": Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 INDIANA
L.J. 1229, 1253-54 (1993). As Part I and Appendix I of this Article detail, this is
decidedly no longer the case.
8 Because the main focus of this Article is jury questioning in operation, the history
ofjury questioning is not within its purview. See, e.g., Jennifer Walker Elrod, Is the
Jury Still Out?: A Case for the Continued Viability of the American Jury, 44 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 303 (2012); Kaufmann & Murphy, supra note 6; Anthony Valen, Jurors
Asking Questions: Revolutionary or Evolutionary?, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 423,423 (1993)
("Juror questions have only recently.., become the subject ofwidespread experimen-
tation and serious discussion."); Laurie Forbes Neff, The Propriety of Jury Ques-
tioning:A Remedyfor Perceived Harmless Error, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 437 (2001); Stewart
M. Young, What's Goodfor the Bench Is Goodfor the Jury, 41 COLO. LAW. 61 (2012).
"Traditionally, jurors would never have been permitted to ask questions of a
witness or the defendant even during a civil trial." Elrod, supra, at 328 (citing a 1990
"nationwide survey of more than 500 judges indicating that 77% of them never allow
jurors to ask witnesses questions"); see also Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Breaking the
Silence: Should Jurors Be Allowed to Question Witnesses During Trial, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 117 (1991); Michael A. WolffJuror Questions: A Survey of Theory and Use, 55
Mo. L. REV. 817 (1990).
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change as if American courts adopted the South African model of placing
a second set of judges (there, called "assessors") on the bench to assist
the trial judge in rendering a verdict.' And this revolution is notable in
two other ways. First, it is not one in the making. To the contrary, it is
not only substantially afait accompli,l° but it has generated a body of case
law" large enough to indicate that it is at least on its way to being
considered mature. Second, with rare exception, such as in high profile
trials,2 this has happened with little publicity and even less public
debate3 such that it can be fairly described as a "silent" revolution. Any
silence or tacit acceptance on the part of trial lawyers may not indicate
approval. "
This Article analyzes the current state of jury questioning, including
the extent to which it is required or discretionary; how it has--or has
9 See Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 § 93ter (S. Afr.).
(1) The judicial officer presiding at any trial may, if he deems it expedient for the
administration of justice: (a) before any evidence has been led, . . . summon to his
assistance any one or two persons who, in his opinion, may be of assistance at the
trial of the case ... to sit with him as assessor or assessors: provided that if an
accused is standing trial in the court of a regional division on a charge of murder.
. the judicial officer shall at that trial be assisted by the two assessors unless such
an accused requests hat the trial be proceeded with without assessors, whereupon
the judicial officer may in his discretion summon one or two assessors to assist him.
Id.
to See discussion infra Part I.
See discussion infra Part IV.
12 See, e.g., Elliot C. McLaughlin, Haven't Been Following the Jodi Arias Trial?
Read This, CNN (May 8, 2013, 8:19 AM), http://www.enn.com/2013/05/04/us/
jodi-arias-primer/. For an excellent example of jury questioning, see the lengthy
transcript reflecting numerous and pointed questions asked by jurors of the defendant,
aired on the Nancy Grace show on CNN on March 7, 2013. Nancy Grace, More Jury
Questions for Jodi Arias, CNN (Mar. 7, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/1 303/07/ng.01 .html.
13 The area of legal scholarship reveals a substantial amount of discussion and
research on jury questioning. See infra Parts II & IV. However, the result appears to
be quite different for the general public. A Google search of the term "New York
Times" coupled with "questions by jurors," last performed April 23,2014, among other
searches performed, returned, given the vastness of the Internet, a relative scarcity of
results reflecting publicity or public debate about jury questioning. But see Lis Wiehl,
After 200 Years, the Silent Juror Learns to Talk, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., July 10,
1989, at 9.
14 See discussion infra Parts III & IV.
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not-been used, and of significant importance, why or why not; the
degree of correlation between concerns, advantages and disadvantages
as predicted on the one hand, and as actually found in statistical research
on the other; the body of appellate case law relevant to the particulars of
jury questioning and the issues they have raised; and, a new survey on
how it is both used and working in criminal and civil cases. Following
this Introduction, the extent to which jury questioning is now authorized
is discussed in Part I. In Part II, the Article focuses on major surveys and
pilot projects which evidence jury questioning's benefits and problems.
Part III presents a 2013 survey, performed by the author, of judges,
prosecutors and public defenders of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in Florida
with the goal of discovering how those with the best vantage point believe
jury questioning is (or is not) working, and why. In Part IV, the Article
discusses the case law of jury questioning, focusing on problems
stemming from its use at trial in varying jurisdictions. After the Article
concludes, Appendix I provides a compendium of how the separate states,
as well as the United States Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts, treat
jury questioning. Appendices II, 11, and IV detail the results of the Ninth
Judicial Circuit survey.
I. Juror Questioning Is Well Established
as an Authorized Trial Procedure-
What Would Stand in the Way of its Use?
Save only a small minority ofjurisdictions, juror questioning is today
authorized by case law, Rules of Procedure (civil and criminal), Jury
Instructions, Rules of Evidence or Rules of Court, throughout the United
States, in both federal and state courts, either on a mandatory or discre-
tionary bases in both civil and criminal cases." Notwithstanding that the
Supreme Court has never ruled on this procedure, having denied certiorari
four times on cases where juror questioning was an issue on appeal,6
juror questioning's ascension as a recognized trial procedure is complete.
" See infra Appendix I.
16 See id.
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In its mechanics this procedure has become relatively generic.7 An
exemplar is found in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.452, "Questions
by Jurors":
(a) Questions Permitted. The court shall permit jurors to submit to the
court written questions directed to witnesses or to the court. Such questions
will be submitted after all counsel have concluded their questioning of a
witness.
(b) Procedure. Any juror who has a question directed to the witness or
the court shall prepare an unsigned, written question and give the question
to the bailiff, who will give the question to the judge.
(c) Objections. Out of the presence of the jury, the judge will read the
question to all counsel, allow counsel to see the written question, and give
counsel an opportunity to object to the question."
Regarding this procedure, the more difficult analysis, separate and apart
from the existence of authority for jury questioning, is to determine how
often it is used nationwide today. Research reveals only one statistical
source that indirectly sheds light on this subject-the nationwide Judge
& Lawyer Survey conducted by the National Center for State Courts.9
This survey included data from all fifty states, 4336 federal and state
judges, 7209 attorneys (of which 5885 practiced criminal defense, "Civil
Plaintiff' or "Civil Defense"), and 5622 criminal trials and 5819 civil
trials, the great majority of which took place between 2002 and 2006.20
"7 Cf New Jersey Rule of Court 1:8-8(d), which states in pertinent part:
The jurors' questions shall be submitted to the court in writing at the conclusion of
the testimony for each witness and before the witness is excused. The court, with
counsel, shall review the questions out of the presence of the jury. Counsel shall
state on the record any objections they may have, and the court shall rule on the
permissibility of each question. The witness shall then be recalled, and the court
shall ask the witness those questions ruled permissible. Counsel shall, on request,
be permitted to reopen direct and cross-examination to respond to the jurors'
questions and the witness's answers.
N.J. R. CT. 1:8-8(d).
8 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.452.
Gregory E. Mize et al., The State-of-the-States Survey of Jury Improvement
Efforts: A Compendium Report, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (2007). The Judge &
Lawyer Survey was one of three surveys included in the Report. Id. at 27.
20 Id. at 4. Table 2.
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Juror questioning at that time was the exception. This survey reported
that it was used in 14.0% of state criminal trials, 11.4% of federal
criminal trials, 16.1% of state civil trials, and 10.9% of federal civil
trials.2' Although these percentages are low, caution should be exercised
in considering them. First, they are based on reports provided between
eight and twelve years ago, when fewer jurisdictions authorized jury
questioning." Second, the survey results do not specify how many trials
were reported in each year. If, for example, a high percentage was
reported in 2002, whenjuror questioning was least authorized, that would
cause the percentages to be lower. Finally, there is no reasonable or
statistical basis to extrapolate from these results any projection of how
often juror questioning is being done today.
Because it does not appear that any survey of comparable size and
including questions about juror questioning has been conducted since,
including but not limited to any follow-up surveys by the National Center
for State Courts,2 3 equivalent evidence that would help determine current
usage of juror questioning is sorely lacking.
There is evidence, however, to help determine why this procedure is
being used, and why not. This analysis must begin with the fact that
today, by far, the greatest number of jurisdictions give trial judges dis-
cretion to use or not use juror questioning.24 But for their authorizing its
use in their courtrooms, juror questioning would be nothing more than
a concept. What, then, may account for their decisions to allow or not
allow it? This question is critical for both the present and future ofjuror
questioning.
A co-author of the Report that included the Judge & Lawyer Survey
discussed above, asked the question, "To what extent does the existence
or absence of legal authority, and the direction of that authority, affect
21 Id. at 32, Table 24.
22 See infra Appendix I. Authority for a number ofjurisdictions catalogued therein
arose during or after 2002-2006.
23 Email from Paula Hannaford-Agor, Director, Center for Jury Studies, to Ariel
Niles, Research Assistant (Aug. 28, 2013 16:19 EST) (on file with author) ("My sense
based solely on anecdotal evidence is that the practice is very slowly gaining traction
in state courts ....").
24 See infra Appendix I.
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the propensity of judges to permit jurors to submit questions to wit-
nesses?
' 25
Examining data from the Judge & Lawyer Survey, she termed the
results "quite surprising," especially with respect to civil trials":
-"Language discouraging the practice of juror questions, or
opinions that simply fail to express an opinion on the practice, appear
to inhibit judges' willingness to permit jurors to submit questions to
witnesses in criminal trials, but the practice was used in nearly twice
as many trials in states where the case law endorsed the practice.,
26
-"In civil trials, however, the language of existing case law had
exactly the opposite effect. One-third of civil trials in states with case
law discouraging juror questions actually employed the practice at
trial, while only 1 9[%] did so when the case law endorsed the practice
and only 14[%] did so when the case law was neutral on the ques-
tion.""
-"The existence of some form of positive law authorizing the
practice did not affect the frequency of its use in criminal trials, but
did in civil trials.,
28
-"Clearly, the existence of legal authority for the practice has some
measurable impact on actual trial proceedings, but.., the study found
that local community practice has the single biggest impact on actual
trial practices for both criminal and civil trials. Trial judges, it seems,
take their cues about how best to exercise their discretion primarily
from their peers, rather than from more formal legal authority. To
some extent, local community practice prevails even in spite of formal
legal authority.
29
Although trial judges in all "discretionary"jurisdictions certainly have
the final authority to allow juror questioning, attorneys do play a role in
25 Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Judicial Nullification? Judicial Compliance and Non-
Compliance with Jury Improvement Efforts, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 407, 416 (2008).
26 Id.
27 Id. (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 417.
29 Id. at 417-18.
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the decision. They can do one of three things: stay silent and hope that
the trial judge, not hearing any requests30 to use this procedure, will not
order its use; ask the court to allow it; or, object to opposing counsel's
request to allow it. In the first and third cases, attorneys' objections to
juror questioning, whether specific to the case or otherwise, may serve
to bar the jurors from enjoying the benefits of questioning.31
What bases could there be for objecting, other than for specific and
objective tactical reasons? Two likely bases, discussed in the literature
on jury questioning, are suggested here, although there certainly are more.
They are the fear of losing control, and interference with the attorney's
trial strategy. As one judge stated:
A number of reasons probably account for [juror questions generating the
most controversy], but the fundamental reason, in my view, is that the
suggestion goes to a core concern of the advocate-maintaining control over
the case-and of the judge-keeping control over the trial. These concerns
generate opposition by the legal fraternity, notwithstanding demonstrated
benefits and available safeguards to ensure an orderly trial. 2
Another judge stated, "I suggest he reluctance to expand the powers of
totally passive and unenlightened juries stems from three sources: (1) the
tremendous inertia of long-standing legal tradition, (2) a basic distrust
ofjuries, and (3) trial attorneys' and judges' fear of loss of control of the
trial process."33
30 Interview with Belvin Perry, Jr., Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit for
Orange and Osceola Counties, Florida (2013). In connection with the survey found at
Part III, the author asked Judge Perry, who had been on the criminal bench for many
years, including while juror questions were discretionary with the court in criminal
cases, how many times he had used the procedure. Judge Perry thought for a moment,
and answered, "None." The author asked Judge Perry how many times he had been
requested to do so. He thought for a longer moment, and said, "I never have."
" See infra discussion as to benefits of questioning at Part II(A), (B), and (C).
32 See Dann, supra note 7, at 1253.
" Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge's Perspective on Providing Tools For Rational
Jury Decisionmaking, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 221, 222 (1990). The author is a circuit
judge in Dane County, Wisconsin. Id. at 221. He cites various reasons why he is in
favor ofjury questioning. Id. at 222. "It is an almost impossible task for even the most
conscientious lawyer to anticipate all the relevant and probative inferences a jury may
seek to explore in a moderately complex trial .... [T]his task [is] insurmountable."
Id. at 225 n.14.
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In a 2000 pilot project34 on juror questioning approved by the New
Jersey Supreme Court involving 272 attorneys, its Report stated that "the
most common concerns expressed by attorneys were interference with
trial strategy and loss of control over witnesses."35  Another study
reported that "[p]reliminary questioning of trial attorneys about juror
questions revealed some fear that juror questions would play havoc with
attorney trial strategies. However, attorneys who participated in trials
with questions reported this was not a problem."36
Part 1II includes a 2013 survey that sheds additional light on reasons
for the reluctance of judges and, particularly, trial counsel in criminal
cases, to allow, request or agree to the use of juror questioning.
II. Purported Advantages and Disadvantages
of Jury Questioning: Fact or Fiction?
Since the first research on jury questioning was performed, believed
to be in 1983,37 there has been a dearth of neither predictions nor
discussion as to the advantages or disadvantages jury questioning would
create. In considering whether to allow such a significant change in trial
" JURY SUBCOMMITTEE (OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURTS CIVIL PRACTICE
COMMITTEE), REPORT ON PILOT PROJECT ALLOWING JUROR QUESTIONS 1 (2000),
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/jurypilot/jurypilot.htm.
3 Id. at 4.
36 Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to
Jury Decision Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 259, 275 (1997).
37 See Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Con-
ducted by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423 (1985)
(offering results from approximately 100 jury trials overseen by twenty-eight judges
in the Second Circuit).
31 See, e.g., Richard W. Creswell, Georgia Courts in the 21st Century: The Report
of the Supreme Court of Georgia Blue Ribbon Commission on the Judiciary, 53
MERCER L. REV. 1,1 (2001); Kara Lundy, Juror Questioning of Witnesses: Questioning
the United States Criminal Justice System, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2007, 2040 (2001)
("Permitting jurors to question witnesses violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury by transforming the jury into an active, partial decisionmaking
body.... Although there may be problems with the jury system, juror questioning is
not the solution. Trial courts should not continue to violate a criminal defendant's right
to a fair trial. In the future, jurors should remain silent."); Nicole L. Mott, The Current
Debate on Juror Questions: "To Ask or Not to Ask, That Is the Question ", 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1099 (2003); Wolff, supra note 8.
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procedure, "predictions" and "discussion" should not be sufficient to
determine its merit or lack thereof. Fortunately, many of these predic-
tions have been statistically tested. In the two bodies of research next
discussed, statistical testing is particularly well correlated to purported
advantages and disadvantages.
A. The Penrod and Heuer Studies
Steven Penrod and Larry Heuer have conducted extensive studies
regarding jury behavior, both nationally and in Wisconsin, including jury
questioning,39 and reported the following statistical findings.4n
1. Purported Advantages of Juror Questions
"Juror questions promotejuror understanding ofthe facts and issues
and alleviate juror doubts about trial evidence."'" The findings "gen-
erally support the view thatjuror questions serve a clarifying function."42
Jurors also said that they felt somewhat better informed by the evidence
and were more confident "that they had sufficient information for
reaching a responsible verdict in trials where questions were allowed."'43
And "jurors who were permitted to ask questions were more satisfied that
the questioning of witnesses had been thorough, seldom thought hat a
witness needed to be further questioned, and were more satisfied that the
jury had sufficient information to reach a responsible verdict.""
" The national study included 160 civil and criminal trials with 103 judges from 33
states; completed questionnaires were submitted by 150 judges, 220 attorneys, and
1229 jurors. In the Wisconsin study conducted in state trial courts, responses were
received from 63 judges, 95 attorneys and 550 jurors. See generally Larry B. Heuer
& Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and
Preliminary Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409,409-30 (1989); Larry B. Heuer
& Steven D. Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials: A National
Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 121-50 (1994); Larry B. Heuer &
Steven D. Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its
Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 29-51 (1994).
40 Penrod & Heuer, supra note 36, at 274-79.
41 Id. at 274.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 275.
44 Id.
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"Juror questions help jurors get to the truth."45 Both the judges and
attorneys surveyed "did not expectjuror questions to help get to the truth,
and after participating in trials where questions were allowed, they
reported that the questions were not very helpful."' 6 The authors posit
that this response on the part of the attorneys is not surprising because,
given their extensive knowledge of the case, "they will have anticipated
most of the questions jurors might pose."'47 Although this is likely true,
another explanation may lie in the form of professional pride-they did
not want to admit that they had missed questions that mattered.
"Juror questions alert trial counsel to particular issues that require
further development.""8 "In both studies, judges and lawyers expected
juror questions to provide useful information about he jury's thinking,
but after participating in trials in which questions were permitted, both
judges and lawyers agreed that questions did not yield these benefits."49
"Juror questions increase juror, attorney, or judge satisfaction with
the trial or the verdict."5  "Jurors were quite satisfied with their
experiences, and their assessment was not influenced by the presence or
absence of juror questions."'" Judges and lawyers were reasonably
satisfied with the jury's verdict, with judges somewhat more so than
attorneys, and "these assessments were not influenced by the availability
or absence of juror questions."52
2. Purported Disadvantages of Juror Questions
"Jurors ask inappropriate questions."53 "Our observation... is that
although the jurors did not know the rules of evidence, they asked
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"Trial counsel will be reluctant to object to inappropriate juror
questions."56 "Both of our studies show that lawyers are not immobilized
by such concerns," as in these studies they objected to 20% and 17% of
the questions asked. Judges in the studies, however, both heard argument
and ruled outside the presence of the jury, so there should not have been
a reason for reluctance.
"Jurors are embarrassed or angry when attorneys object to juror
questions.57 No evidence supported this perceived disadvantage.8
"If counsel objects and the objection is sustained, the jury may draw
inappropriate inferencesfrom the unanswered question."59 Although not
phrased exactly this way in the authors' two studies, both the judges and
attorneys responded that they neither expected nor observed either the
surveyed "[j]uror questioning caus[ing] prejudice to my client" or "[t]he
juror questioning procedure undermined the goals of the adversarial
process."6°
"When jurors are allowed to ask questions, they become advocates
rather than neutrals."61 This transition from neutral to advocate was a
significant concern.62 And, there would be no way to survey this transi-
tion directly except to ask the jurors point-blank, for example, "Did you
believe you became an advocate when you asked one or more questions
of the witnesses?"--a question which was not asked. Instead, this feared
disadvantage was found to be unproven based on the fact that (1) verdict
data showed that jury questions had no significant effect on the verdicts,
(2) jurors and judges "agreed on the verdicts in approximately 70% of
all cases," and (3) "neither lawyer was perceived less favorably as a result
of the question-asking procedure (a result that might be expected if the
jurors lost sight of their neutrality).63
56 id.
57 id.
" Id. at 276-77.
59 Id.
60 Id at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Id.
62 Penrod & Heuer, supra note 36, at 278. The authors cite several decisions to this
effect. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 713 (8th Cir. 1989).
63 Penrod & Heuer, supra note 36, at 278.
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"Jurors overemphasize answers to their own questions at the expense
of other trial evidence."64 The evidence was to the contrary because (1)
the jurors were "quite modest in their appraisal of the helpfulness ofjuror
questions,"65 and (2) only about ten percent of their deliberation time (an
average of fifteen minutes) was spent discussing answers to juror
questions.66
"Juror questions have a prejudicial effect." Obviously critical, as
phrased this issue encompassed arange of unspecified factors. Favorably
for jury questioning, the answer was decidedly in the negative. As the
authors explained:
In our studies ofjury questioning, signs of prejudice were most thoroughly
explored in the national study by using dependent measures such as jury
verdicts, judge-jury agreement on verdicts, lawyer satisfaction with verdicts,
and juror impressions of the lawyers. The results were clearly contrary to
what would be expected if questions had prejudicial effects: Jury questions
did not affect the pattern ofjury verdicts and did not affectjudge-jury verdict
agreement, the judges and lawyers did not see such prejudicial effects (even
though the lawyers expected them to see them before they had experience
with jury questions), and jurors had more favorable views of both attorneys
in trials where juror questions were permitted.67
In sum, although the purported advantages were somewhat supported by
this research, the findings were overwhelmingly contrary to the fears or
beliefs thatjury questioning would cause any of the examined "disadvan-
tages."
B. The Colorado Jury Reform Pilot Project
The Colorado jury reform pilot proj ect took place in two phases from
2000 to 2001.68 Between both phases, the jury reform project received
64 id.
61 Id. at 278-79.
66 Id. at 279.
67 Id.
61 MARY DODGE, SHOULD JURORS ASK QUESTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES? A REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S JURY SYSTEM COMMITTEE 1-5
(2002).
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responses from 1904 jurors, 199 judges and 424 attorneys.69 It was "in
part designed to replicate the Heuer and Penrod studies specifically for
criminal cases."7 In fact, the testing went substantially farther.71 In
doing so, it provided the most extensive but specific testing of concerns,
purported advantages, and disadvantages to date. The results follow.
72
1. Do Juror Questions Cause Excessive Delays to the Trial
Process?73
Forty-one percent of the jurors submitted at least one question during
their trial.74 Approximately 86% of the attorneys said that questions were
proposed in their trials, and "in almost all of the cases judges did ask the
submitted questions."75 This response, one can reasonably state, is
startling because jurors are not lawyers. They have no knowledge of the
rules of evidence, and their questions, just as the attorneys' questions,
must be unobjectionable or they will not be asked by the court of the
witness.76 Even trial attorneys may have objections sustained against
them as much as five percent of the time.77 Although this question tested
for delay, its responses strongly support the evidentiary worthiness of
juror questions (contrary to claims of irrelevance or inadmissibility under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
69 Id. at 9, 51.
70 Id. at 3.
"' Id. at 2-4.
72 Where the percentage results are particularly relevant, they will be recited.
Otherwise, the results will be described more generally.
73 DODGE, supra note 68, at 15. The findings noted here were from Phase One of
the study, which had a far greater number of responses than were received in Phase
Two.
74 Id.
71 Id.; cf id. at Table 7. In the district and county courts combined, the average
numbers of questions (1) submitted per trial was 9.16, (2) asked was 7.15, (3) declined
was 2.39, and (4) rephrased and asked was .61. Id. Adding (2) and (4) equals an
average of 7.76 asked, which for non-lawyers, out of 9.16, is still extremely high.
76 See discussion supra Part I.
77 See discussion supra Part I.
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Going into the project, the author noted that the concern of excessive
time being spent on jury questions "may represent he foremost concern
for judges."78 This concern was not borne out. To the contrary, 92% of
the jurors, 74% of the attorneys, and a majority of the judges, did "not
believe that the delays or interruptions were excessive beyond what was
necessary and acceptable."79 The average (mean) time in the questioning
process was only 12 minutes, with a median of 5.50 minutes and a mode
(most frequently occurring time) of 5 minutes.80 By any measure, jury
questioning did not cause undue delay to the trial process.
One additional finding here is relevant to the issue broached above
in Part I: whether judges' reluctance to allow jury questions is caused in
material part by their negative assumptions not (yet) contradicted by
experience in doing so. Only 41.4% of the judges who did not employ
jury questioning, and therefore based their opinion "on speculation,
believed that delays or interruptions caused by jury questions were not
excessive, while 84.5[%] of those judges who did employ jury question-
ing found that any such delays were not."81 This difference is substantial
and a strong indicator, where jury questioning is concerned, that the old
maxim, "experience is an excellent teacher," is true.
2. Did Questions Impact Defendants' Decision to Testify?
The answer, across the board, was that it did not. According to the
judges, there was no meaningful difference between the number of times
defendants testified in jury questioning cases, called "Questions Pre-
sented" cases (QP), and in non-jury questioning cases, called "Questions
Not Presented" cases (QNP).82 Ofthe attorneys, 87% said the questioning
procedure, when allowed, had no impact on the choice to testify and 81%
said that juror questions had "no weight" in the decision.83
78 DODGE, supra note 68, at 17.
79 Id.
80 Id.
SI Id. at 19, Table 8.
82 Id. at 21.
83 id.
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3. Did the Procedures Successfully Screen Improper
Questions?
Judges in most cases were able to identify questions that were
inappropriate and screen them successfully.84 This is not surprising. As
noted previously, objections to jurors' written questions normally are
resolved at a bench conference outside the hearing of the jury, but the
judge has a full opportunity to hear all objections.8 5
As for the attorneys responding to this question, they were "less
optimistic that improper questions were eliminated, with the majority
indicating sometimes."86 Because the judge will be hearing and ruling
on objections made to both jurors' and attorneys' questions, this is a
curious response. One possible explanation is that attorneys feel that
judges have been reluctant to sustain objections to jurors' questions
simply because they were jurors'questions. One could have thought the
opposite-that because they were not attorneys, and did not know the
rules of evidence, judges would be more likely to sustain objections to
their questions.
4. What are the Dynamics of Declining Jurors' Questions?
In short, statistically, there were none. "It was rare for a judge or
attorney to observe any unfavorable reactions from the jurors after a
question was declined. Jurors appeared to accept the ruling and showed
no observable negative reaction to the decision."7
5. Judges' and Attorneys' Perceptions of Jurors Who Asked
Questions
The results showed, perhaps most interestingly, that "from thejudges'
and attorneys' perspective the jurors appeared to be focused on relevant
14 Id. at 23.
" See discussion supra Part I and note 17 (regarding the typical procedure used by
the court and counsel when jurors wish to have questions asked).
86 DODGE, supra note 68, at 23.
87 Id. at 24.
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issues and stayed on task.""8 The majority of attorneys believed that the
jurors obtained information pertaining to the case through this process,
but only one-quarter thought that the answers produced information that
was necessary for them.89 And, to varying degrees, both judges and
attorneys found that jurors sent signals of various meaning with their
questions, for example, "indicate[d] jurors taking sides in the case" or
"indicate[d] argumentative or hostile behavior from a juror."9
6. Do Juror Questions Have a Prejudicial Impact?
Almost unanimously, the answer was that they do not. Ninety-seven
percent ofthe judges said the juror questioning procedure followed at trial
caused no actual prejudice to any of the parties.9' Ninety-nine percent
of the jurors found that the judge did not favor one side.92 And, once
again, the statistical results on this issue showed that experience with
juror questioning positively enhanced judges' perceptions. When asked
if they believed the questioning resulted in actual prejudice, approxi-
mately 3 8% of the QNP judges said "yes," as compared to approximately
only 1% of the QP judges who said "no. 93
7. What Impact Did Questions Have on the Trial?
Overall, 40% of the judges said the procedure was favorable, while
16% said it was unfavorable.94 As for the attorneys, the majority said
either they did not believe the questions had an effect on the trial, or they
had no opinion.95
" Id. at 26.
89 Id.
90 Id. at Table 12.
9' Id. at 27.
92 Id. It does not appear that the attorneys were surveyed on these particular
matters. See generally id.
" Id. at 27.
94 DODGE, supra note 68, at 30.
95 Id.
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8. Comparing Judges' and Attorneys' Favor or Opposition to
Juror Questions Before and After Trial
Judges' opinions were essentially unchanged, at approximately 75%
favorable both before and after trial.96 Attorneys, on the other hand,
significantly shifted their opinions, from 40% favorable before to 49%
after.97 And, for prosecutors, the rise in their "favorable" opinion of this
procedure was greater still-from 72% to 90% favorable.98 Defense
counsel moved from approximately 23% to 30%.99
This statistical finding raises the interesting question of why prosecu-
tors have a much more favorable opinion of jury questioning. One
possibility is that prosecutors may have less time to prepare for trial than
private defense counsel, due to having higher case loads.' With less
time to plan they may be more comfortable than private defense counsel
with shifts at trial that are caused, or which they perceive to be occurring,
due to the content of jurors' questions. Another possibility is that
prosecutors have the heavy burden at trial of proving the charge beyond,
and to the exclusion of, all reasonable doubt. They may welcome signals
from the jury in the form of questions indicating, as they may perceive
it, weaknesses in that proof. Defense counsel, on the other hand, hoping
in every case that the prosecution fails in its burden as to at least one
element of the crime charged, would not generally be pleased to hear such
questions. Rather, they would likely believe that jurors, through their
questions, are giving such signals to the prosecution. Additional research
as to why this great difference exists would be welcome.
9. Benefits of Other Jurors' Questions
By all reports the benefits were extensive, and the detriments insignifi-
cant. Eighty-three percent said that other jurors' questions clarified the




100 Given the well-known and large caseloads of public defenders, likely comp-
arable to those of prosecutors, this would not seem to explain any difference between
prosecutors and public defenders. This project did not, however, segregate between
public defenders and private defense counsel. See generally DODGE, supra note 68.
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testimony (17% said no), and 86% said theyprovided important informa-
tion (14% said no).,'l Statistical evidence for negative effects was sorely
lacking-91% denied that such questions caused the juror to "form an
opinion about the outcome of the case based mainly on the questions and
answer" (9% said they did), and 94% denied the fact that they were
questions fiom otherjurors caused them to focus on them to the exclusion
of others (6% said they did). 2
10. Final Deliberations'°3
Juror questions made a positive difference. Those who were in the
QP group "were more likely to believe that they had sufficient informa-
tion to reach a correct decision compared to the QNP group. These
findings suggest that when permitted to submit questions jurors have
fewer unanswered items on the table during deliberations."'0 4
11. Discussion
This pilot project generated little doubt about what the results showed
for juror questioning:
The strongest case for allowing the procedure is derived from the jurors'
self-reports. The questioning procedure empowers the jurors and actively
engages them in the trial-judges and attorneys also agree on this point.
Even the opportunity to submit a question is viewed positively by jurors
since the process is more inclusive and interactive. Most significant are data
that indicate jurors are more satisfied with the trial process and have more
favorable reactions to the trial experience. Jurors, overwhelmingly, believe
that the opportunity to ask questions should be included in all trials.
The results of the research indicate that allowing jurors to ask questions
at trial will have positive effects with few detrimental results. The procedure
does not appear to cause any "harm" to the lawyers or the witnesses and the
"worst fears" were realized only in the exceptional case.1" 5
101 DODGE, supra note 68, at 40, Table 22.
102 Id.
0o3 Id. at 40, Table 23.
04 Id. at 40.
1o5 Id. at 58.
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When tested against statistical evidence, the purported advantages here
were substantially factual. The disadvantages, however, were not so
fortunate. They were proven at least substantially, and arguably over-
whelmingly, to be fiction.
C. Additional Research Findings:
Non-correlative, but Still Revealing
Although not specifically correlated with purported advantages or
disadvantages of jury questioning, the following research findings help
portray how this procedure has functioned or been evaluated by judges
or attorneys.
In what appears to be the first research done on jury questioning, an
experiment performed at the behest of the Second Circuit in 1983,106
prosecutors and plaintiffs' counsel were "overwhelmingly favorable in
their assessments of this procedure,"'' 7 while, "in contrast, the responses
from defense counsel were much more equivocal."'' 8 This is consistent
with the previously discussed research.'09
A survey ofjudges from forty-eight states, Washington, D.C. and the
Virgin Islands, with 553 responding by the time of publication in 1990,
showed the degree to which they allowed jury questioning was extremely
low." 0 In the category of sixty-six "predominantly civil" judges, the
mean allowing this procedure was seven percent, and the median zero."'
With eighty-five "predominantly criminal" judges responding, as well
as with 123 "mixed" practice judges, the means were 11% and the
medians zero."12
'06 See generally Sand & Reiss, supra note 37.
07 Id. at 445.
108 Id.
'09 See discussion supra Part II(B).
"o Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Some Suggestions for the Critical Appraisal of
a More-Active Jury, 85 N.W. U.L. REV. 226, 229-30 (1990). This survey was not final
at the time their article was published, but the authors believed they had information
sufficient to address judges' experience with jury questioning. Id.
. Id. at 30.
112 Id.
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A 1997-1998 survey ofNorth Carolinajurors, serving in a state which
did not allow jury questioning, found that 57% of the 1303 jurors
responding said it would "have helped to be able to ask questions of
witnesses," while 43% said it would not.'13 In comparison to results
discussed in this Part from jurors who served in trials where they could
ask questions, this "favorable" percentage is very low. 114 This low
percentage may be explained by the fact that these jurors were responding
about their wish for jury questioning ex post facto, and without ever
having the experience of asking questions in their trials.
In a 1997 Texas Supreme Court-sponsored survey, 115 civil court
judges responded to the following statement: "Trial courts shall have
discretion to permit the use ofjury questions to witnesses with maximum
procedural protections."1 5 Only 51.31% said "Yes" and 48.69% said
"No/Undecided."'
16
This finding is surprising, in one respect, because nearly half of the
judges responding did not think even they should have at least the
discretion to allow jury questioning. That these civil court judges felt
this way makes this result even more surprising, in that they could not
have based their feeling on the potential disadvantage of their jurors'
questions infringing on the defendant's constitutional rights. What
remains, it seems, is that their feeling of disapproval was a strong one.
On the other hand, this result is not surprising because of how long ago,
relatively speaking in "juror questioning" years, this survey took place.
With juror questioning by no means widespread in 1997 and research
showing that judges perceive it more favorably when they have experi-
ence using it, 7 one may have expected significant hesitation in their
survey responses here.
Juror questioning research arising out of the Arizona Filming Project,
a 1998 study in which fifty civil trials were videotaped, including juror
'"3 Brian L. Cutler & Donna M. Hughes, Judging Jury Service: Results of the North
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts Juror Survey, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 305,
313 (2001).
'" See discussion supra Parts III(A) & (B).
... R.N. Singh et al., Reforming the Jury System: What Do the Judges Think?, 63
TEX. B.J. 948, 952 (2000).
116 id.
.. See research & discussion supra Part I(B).
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discussions and eliberations, produced a number of findings illuminative
of how this procedure operates:'
1 8
*"[F]ears that trial time will be extended substantially bypermitting
juror questions appear unwarranted, at least when the courts and
attorneys manage the process efficiently." '119
-Judges permitted witnesses to answer 76% of jurors' questions
overall. 120
-The largest category of questions, at 42%, was "Cross-Checking,"
which "jurors use[d] ... to assist them in evaluating witness credibil-
ity and judging the plausibility of witness accounts, particularly those
of interested witnesses whose credibility is in doubt. Jurors look for
evidence from disinterested witnesses or non-witness sources of
probative information to compare that information with claims from
other sources."'
121
-Of the 829 questions that jurors submitted, only 8.3% appeared
argumentative.122 In 30 of the 50 cases, no such questions were sub-
mitted.123 In ten of them, one was.2 4 And, one case was responsible
for ten of these questions-with the same juror probably responsible
for eight of those.1 25 "This pattern, while based on a small sample,
suggests that concerns thatjurors permitted to submit questions during
trial will generally become adversarial and argumentative in their
questioning are unfounded.'
126
A 2003-2004 New Jersey survey of civil presiding judges answered
the interesting question of, where a witness testifies by videotape or
deposition, whether juror questions should be permitted of the other
"'8 Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Questions During Trial: A Window into
Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1941-42 (2006).
119 Id. at 1942.
1
20 Id. at 1938.
.. Id. at 1956.
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party's corresponding witness(es).127 Fifty-six percent of the 232 judges
surveyed said "no," with the primary reason being "to ensure a level
playing field.',12' That 44% said "yes" indicates that either there was
doubt that allowing juror questions would tilt the field to begin with, or
that the importance of allowing them to ask outweighed any unfairness. 1
29
The Seventh Circuit Project, conducted from 2005 to 2008, tested juror
questions in 50 trials and analyzed responses from 434 jurors, 22 federal
trial judges, and 86 attorneys.130 The results were both consistent with
those discussed above13' and encouraging:
[T]he vast majority of jurors, 83[%], reported that the ability to submit
written questions helped their understanding of the facts. Judges and
attorneys who participated in trials in which juror questions were permitted
also responded very favorably to the procedure, with 77[%] of judges and
65 [%] of attorneys reporting increases in juror understanding. Moreover,
75[%] of judges and 66[%] of attorneys saw no reduction in efficiency
associated with permitting juror questions. The Seventh Circuit Jury Project
Commission therefore strongly recommends u e of this procedure in future
state and federal jury trials.
132
In a pilot project conducted by the Michigan Supreme Court from
2008 to 2010, with 54 attorneys from 30 trials responding, only"approxi-
mately 35 [%] thought juror questions increased the fairness of the trial,
while fewer than . .. 49[%] thought the questions increased jurors'
understanding.'' 133 These percentages stand in contrast to the jurors'
feedback, in that 98% "thought questions should be allowed;" '134 64%
127 Report of the Conference of Civil Presiding Judges on Its Evaluation of Juror




130 Am. Jury Project Comm'n, Seventh Circuit Bar Ass'n, Seventh CircuitAmerican
Jury Project: Final Report 13, 22 (2008), available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/
www.7thcircuitbar.org/resource/resmgr/imported/7th%20Circuit%20American%20
Jury%20Project%2OFinal%20Report.pdf [hereinafter Seventh Circuit American Jury
Project].
131 See findings and discussion supra Parts III(A) & (B).
132 Seventh Circuit American Jury Project, supra note 130, at 13.
133 Hicks, supra note 1, at 40.
134 Id.
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"thought allowing questions increased the fairness of the trial;"'' 35 and
72% "said it increased their understanding of the case.'36
D. Summary
Statistically, juror questioning has proven its merit. Purported advan-
tages have been supported and purported concerns or disadvantages
disproven. Forjurors themselves, there is great enthusiasm for the right
to ask questions of witnesses and to be a true participant in their trials-
and also, in their view, bringing significant benefits from the use of this
procedure. As for judges or attorneys, there more recently is great
support for juror questioning, albeit less than by jurors. The extent that
judges and attorneys have been reluctant may be explained, at least in
part, by (1) their having expressed this opinion prior to the near-present,
when juror questioning has become almost universally permitted'37 and
(2) their not having been involved in juror questioning, as the research
shows that experience with this procedure results in greater enthusiasm.
There can be little doubt at this time, with all three trial participant groups
having spoken, repeatedly, that juror questioning is an innovation whose
time has fully arrived.
III. The 2013 Ninth Judicial Circuit Survey
on Juror Questioning
In 2013, the author conducted a survey ofjudges (on both the criminal
and civil benches), prosecutors, and public defenders in the Ninth Judicial
Circuit (in and for Orange and Osceola Counties, Florida) on the subject
ofjuror questioning.138 Responses were received from fifty-two judges,
forty-one prosecutors, and eleven public defenders.'39 The results
showed, particularly in criminal cases, (1) a distinct lack of use of this
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See discussion supra Part I; infra Appendix I.
138 See infra Appendices II, III & IV.
"' See id.
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procedure, as well as (2) asserted reasons for this lack of use that, for the
most part, are statistically unsupported, have been disproven, or, are
based more on feeling than logic. 41 In civil cases, the results were far
more favorable for juror questioning.
1 41
This lack of use may initially be explained by the fact that this
procedure is only discretionary in criminal cases but mandatory in civil
cases. 142 However, a closer analysis of these results shows that, separate
and apart from this difference in juror question authority, it is mainly the
attitudes of counsel that drive these results.
In assessing the following findings of note,43 it may be of benefit to
the reader to generally consider them inpari materia, where applicable,
with the statistical research findings cited in Part II of this Article. This
research is particularly beneficial in regard to the findings below as to
why juror questioning was not used.
A. The Judges
1. In Criminal Cases
Only 6 of 28 criminal judges (or 21%), who have presided since Rule
3.371144 came into effect and permitted juror questions, have allowed
them.145 Eleven (39%) have not allowed them, and 11 did not respond.1
46
Eighty-two percent of the judges responding on this issue stated that
the prosecution has never asked to allow juror questioning, and 76% said
the same was true of defense attorneys.
147
Reasons given by judges for allowing jurors to question witnesses
include: "In my opinion, jurors are more invested in the process if
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.371, effective Jan. 1, 2008; see also FLA. R. CIv. P.
1.452, effective Jan. 1, 2008.
"' See infra Appendices II, III & IV.
144 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.371, effective Jan. 1, 2008.
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allowed to ask questions."; "Rule permits it."; "I think it makes them
better listeners and does away with any areas that they are worried
about."; "To assist them in making a decision."; "They asked me if they
could."; and "Parties had no objection."
Only in the first, third and fourth responses did the judges give any
reasons consistent with either the expected or proven benefits of juror
questioning discussed in Part II. Although this sample is small, one
would have hoped for a higher percentage of objectivelypositive reasons
as the bases for their decision to use this procedure.
Of particular importance, since this procedure was discretionary, was
why these judges would not allow it? The following in toto are the
responses to Question 2(d):
Q d Whenyou hav2e nt, whynot?'
1 Too many issues arise. More trouble than it's worth.
2 My concern was that the trial would be taken over by an over-active juror and
lead us into irrelevant areas of inquiry.
3 The attorneys do not favor it. Additionally, if the questions are submitted and
then not asked, there was concern that the jurors would unduly focus on the
questions not asked (whys and why- nots) instead of the evidence presented.
4 Disruptive to the process
5 When involved in trials as an attorney where the procedure was allowed, the
questions were generally objectionable, outside the scope of permissible evi-
dence, or too confusing.
6 Too great a chance to cause a mistrial
7 Too fraught with potential error
8 The burden is on the state to present relevant facts.
9 Potential negative impact on the defendants' rights not worth the risk.
10 Have not found it beneficial, slows proceedings, too many questions posed by
jurors cannot be answered, some jurors seem to focus more on what questions
they will be asking than the testimony given by the witnesses
11 I always have.
12 I have never turned own a request from the jurors, but they rarely ask.
13 Parties have objected.
It must be remembered that these judges' civil brethren have been using
the same process for six years. These objections are either not borne out
[Vol. 3 8: 1.
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or even mentioned as a concern in the extensive body of (highly positive)
research findings discussed in Part 11; or are specifically contrary to some
of these findings. 
141
Fourteen of seventeen judges responding said that prosecutors never
asked to allow juror questioning.149 Thirteen of sixteen said the same
about defense counsel.
150
Among the reasons given in response to the question of why judges
thought defense attorneys objected to juror questioning, were that "[t]hey
do not want jurors filling gaps in the evidence that the state left unfilled"
and "[t]hey believe that it might assist the State in establishing their
burden of proof." These responses are consistent with the reasons
suggested in Part 1(C) that explain why defense attorneys would object.
And, these reasons, from their standpoint, are understandable. On the
other hand, questions from jurors could seek or elicit evidence that would
support the defense. In at least one judge's opinion here, they liked
neither the risk nor the odds.
2. In Civil Cases
Of the six judges responding who have presided since Rule 1.452151
became effective, requiring that juror questions be allowed, not surpris-
ingly 100% did so.'52
Otherwise, the findings for civil judges are noteworthy mainly for their
not reflecting anything materially controversial or oppositional in how
juror questioning is working in their courtrooms.'53 This is consistent
with this procedure working well.
"' Cf, e.g., Response (3) with the disadvantage discussed at Part II(A); Response
(4) with Part II(B); Responses (5) and (10) with the perceived disadvantage discussed
at Part II(A) as well as III(B); and Response (9) with Ill(B).
In regard to Response (12), given that jurors likely would not know they had the
right to at least ask to be able to question witnesses, a preferred method would be to
advise them of the possibility. And, evidence shows that they likely would want the
ability to do so. See findings supra Part II(C).
149 See infra Appendix II.
[so Id.
.". FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.452, effective Jan. 1, 2008.
152 See infra Appendix II.
153 id.
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3. In Criminal and Civil Cases Combined
Only 6 out of 52 judges found (1) that jurors' questions focused on
material issues not sufficiently covered by the attorneys' questions
(thereby indicating that attorneys are doing an excellent job in this
respect) and (2) that attorneys discernibly altered their tactics or argu-
ments based on juror questions.'
B. The Prosecutors
Thirty-nine of 41 prosecutors said they have never asked the court to
allow jurors to ask questions.'55 Two said the percentage of cases in
which they had done so was very small or approximately five percent of
the time.156 Twenty-seven of the 30, who actually responded, said the
defense never did.157 Fourteen out of the 14, who actually responded, said
they had not discerned witnesses being either more truthful or testifying
with greater candor in response to jurors' questions."15
Their comments show that they empathize with why defense attorneys
say they do not like juror questions:' "It is the state's burden of proof,
how many prosecutors do you want in the courtroom? 1, or 7, or 13?";
"The jury was telling the state what additional witnesses to call. It
relieves the state of its burden to prove the case and allows the jurors to
prove the case."; "Almost universally when the court wants to do it the
defense opposes. It's the state's burden; if we miss something, the last
thing a defendant would want is the juror to do our job."
Although prosecutors rarely asked the court to allow juror questions,
when they did ask it was because "the jury instructions [were] particularly
complex" or they wanted to get an "idea of where their minds are at."
On the question so important to the use (or non-use) of the juror
questioning procedure-why they did not ask-they gave the following
responses.
154 Id.




"' See supra Part III(A)(1).
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1 It generally creates more problems than it solves, because most of the ques-
tions can't be answered.
2 Never thought to; Did not think of it; Did not think to do so
3 Never thought about it before and now for past year or so the judges automati-
cally read an instruction to them allowing them to ask questions.
4 Never needed to; Not necessary; Wasn't necessary; Not necessary
5 Was unaware that was allowed; Did not think the parties to the case could
request it.
6 Judge does not ask.
7 Most judges do not favor this practice; My judge did not allow it; Courts
generally don't go for it; Most judges are not open to the idea.
8 Belief that jurors' questions are not likely to be helpful
9 I believe the judges should decide how to run their courtroom.
10 Have not needed too, Judge already allowed
11 Want to stay on track to relevant issues not curiosity
12 It's my case and the defendant's to present, not theirs.
13 It slows down the trial, and they seem to want to know objectionable things.
14 Most judges do not inform the jurors about the ability to ask questions. When
they have the jurors have not asked questions.
15 I want to control the presentation of evidence, and would not ask a question
for a reason.
16 1 don't know, as the State we probably should do it so that a jury doesn't come
back not guilty because of a silly question they could have asked during trial.
17 I usually wait to see if they have any questions.
18 I've had major problems with this.
19 Court usually instructs them on that.
20 Because I don't want jurors asking questions
21 No point
22 Jurors often ask common sense questions that call for inadmissible evidence.
This introduces the possibility that the judge may error and allow something
into (or keep something out of) evidence that will overturn the case on appeal.
23 It is not common practice in criminal
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24 Some judges do it already.
25 Was never instructed by the office to do so
26 Court controls
27 The questions are usually inappropriate or inadmissible.
28 I would never ask the Court to invite jurors to ask questions because I imagine
the questions the jurors will ask will attempt to ascertain answers that likely
are not admissible evidence, and it would make my case presentation less
smooth. I have also never seen a prosecutor, or a defense attorney for that
matter, ask the court to allow jurors to ask questions. I know that a judge may
allow jurors to ask questions of witnesses.
29 It would interrupt the flow of the trial.
30 Complicates the trial
Some of these reasons are consistent with the reasons given by judges
as to why they do not allow this procedure.6 ' However, a number of
them reflect concerns without, in the absence of the respondent stating
any such experience, any discernible objective basis-such as (8), (11),
(28-"I imagine . . .") and (29) ("It would . . ."). Some seem emo-
tional-such as (12) or (20). Some are based merely on habit, or on
judges' practices, when the question is why these attorneys did not even
ask to allow this procedure-such as (4), (6), (7), (9), (23), (24), and (26).
And, others are contrary to research findings, such as (13), 16 1 (22), 162 (29)
and (30).163 Of these thirty reasons, one could argue that none fail to
suffer from any of these infirmities, or that any may reasonably be
considered to be objectively supportable. Yet, it is these reasons, given
by these prosecutors, which are currently playing a role in explaining why
juror questioning is not used more often.
C. The Public Defenders
All eleven public defenders responding said they have never asked the
court to allowjuror questioning. 164 Ten of them state their reasons below.
60 See supra Part III(A)(1).
161 Cf supra Part II(B).
162 Cf supra Part II(B).
163 Cf supra Part II(B).
164 See infra Appendix IV.
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,~ 0 I n ss a part of the ra procss) h nb~ot
1 Rather not have jurors ask questions that might have intentionally not been
asked to possibly add evidence to the State's case.
2 I believe it is harmful to the defense to do so.
3 It is ultimately the responsibility of the state to answer the jurors' questions.
If the jurors have questions, that creates room for reasonable doubt. If the
jury is permitted to ask questions, they are essentially taking on the role of
the prosecutor, which effectively destroys the ability of the defendant in a
criminal case to pick apart a prosecutor's theory of the case and the evi-
dence they present. If jurors have remaining questions, they have reasonable
doubt. If all their questions get answered, not only has the state failed to do
its job properly, but the jury has filled in the gaps left by the state's failure. I
would never want a jury interrogating my client or other witnesses in a
criminal case.
4 Juries sometimes focus on non-issues and I do not want to distract from my
theory.
5 Concerned about what hey would ask
6 Unpredictability of it
7 I want to control all aspects of questioning that I can control.
8 Not sure of the benefit. Many times unanswered questions help reasonable
doubt.
9 I want to control the evidence as much as possible.
10 Usually the Judge is the one who takes the initiative. I am ambivalent about
allowing jurors to ask questions. When they ask questions that are not
admissible I get the feeling they think we are hiding something from them.
Defense objections to juror questioning are based mainly on two
reasons. First, as in (1), (2, probably) and (3), they ascribe to the belief
thatjurors' questions will help prosecutors prove their cases against these
attorneys' clients. However, this appears to be an anxiety not based on
fact or experience. No respondents state here that they have seen this
happen, as opposed to their anxiety that it may or will happen. No re-
search was discovered that tested what can only be called, in the absence
of evidence here, a hypothesis. There is no logical basis to believe juror
questions would help the prosecution more than the defense. Assuming
jury selection resulted in a panel of mostly reasonable-minded, middle-of-
the-road jurors, it would seem more likely that their questions would
favor both sides. And, not all public defenders automatically believe that
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jurors' questions will help prosecutors prove their cases, as even some
prosecutors do.'65 One public defender reported that "[thejurors] started
to ask some very pointed questions of the state's alleged victims and it
became obvious they were having a hard time believing these witnesses."
However, this instance seems not to have made a difference with this
attorney, as all eleven public defenders said they never asked the court
to allow juror questioning.
The second reason for not asking, as seen in (7), (9) and, arguably,
(6) as well, is the fear of losing control. This fear is consistent with the
finding discussed previously that people want to keep control. 66 One
would hope, however, that important decisions, such as whether to ask
for juror questioning or whether to object when juror questioning is
requested, would be made on a more objective basis.
D. Summary
This survey produced some clear, even striking, results regarding juror
questioning in criminal cases. Even though permitted, juror questioning
was almost nonexistent.'67 No groundswell was found among judges for
the practice, and the opposition from prosecutors and public defenders
was nearly total.
There was little evidence that any of the participants were aware of,
much less considered or elied upon in forming their opinions, any of the
statistically-validated benefits that juror questioning brings to the trial
process. Unless they receive an education on these benefits, there is no
substantial reason to believe that this situation will change. However,
as research reveals,'68 if these participants would give juror questioning
the proverbial "fair shake," there is reason to believe that they will either
substantially increase their use of, or possibly even embrace, this most
worthwhile of trial innovations.
69
165 See supra Part Ill(B).
166 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
167 Even Chief Judge Belvin Perry, Jr. said he had "never" even been asked to allow
juror questioning. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
168 See discussion supra Part II(B).
169 This is the overwhelming conclusion of the substantial statistical evidence
discussed in Part II.
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IV. Juror Questioning in the Case Law:
How Far Can Jurors-and Judges-Go?
Separate and apart from cases where juror questions resulted in issues
of admissibility in no different a fashion than if the questions had been
asked by attorneys,7 ° other decisions have marked the limits of juror
questioning for both jurors and judges.
A. Rulings on the Scope of the Questions
In United States v. Stierwalt,171 the defendant argued on appeal that
jurors should not have been permitted to ask "nonclarifying" questions
of the witnesses. The court rejected this argument:
These questions did not elicit new evidence, but filled in innocuous details
of testimony already before the court. Stierwalt's attempts to construe them
as something else are imaginative but unavailing. Moreover, Stierwalt has
not directed our attention to any case in this Circuit or elsewhere where
"nonclarifying"juror questions have been held to violate a defendant's right
to a fair trial. As far as we know, there is no requirement hat juror questions
be merely "clarifying," and we decline Stierwalt's invitation to impose such
a requirement. 172
There are limits, however. In People v. McAlister,'73 a juror asked
what the defendant said on the way to the hospital, would have forced
the defendant to object in front of the jury because the procedure at trial
allowed the juror to directly question the witness.'74 The court held that
this evidence was inadmissible but not prejudicial to the defendant, and
170 See, e.g., Cranmer v. Commonwealth, No. 2000-SC-0778-MR, 2003 WL
21990216 (Ky. Aug 21, 2003) (reversible error to overrule juror's question seeking
inadmissible habit evidence).
"' 16 F.3d 282 (8th Cir. 1993).
17 Stierwalt, 16 F.3d at 286.
7 167 Cal. App. 3d 633 (Ct. App. 1985).
114 McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 645. This issue is no longer a problem, as no
jurisdictions are currently known to allow direct, verbal questioning by jurors.
Questions are to be written, with objections raised and ruled on outside the presence
of the jury. See supra Part I, notes 17-18.
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therefore affirmed the conviction.175 However, it did include as one of
the reasons why counsel should have had the opportunity to object
outside the presence of the juror, the fact that "neither counsel had
previously opened up (the area of what the defendant had said)."'
76
B. Have the Jurors Crossed the Line
and Become Advocates?
Jurors almost certainly "advocate" at trial but only in the sanctity of
the jury room where they may urge their views on otherjurors. For them
to advocate during the presentation of evidence is an entirely different
and, as the following decisions show, serious matter. In Day v.
Kilgore,177 the trial court allowed the jury to ask plaintiff, while he was
on the stand, for a photograph of the front of his automobile.'78 At the
time, he was under re-cross examination by the defense, and the photo-
graph was not in evidence.'79 Moreover, the court, over defense objec-
tions, allowed plaintiffs counsel to interrupt the re-cross examination
of his client to lay a foundation for the photograph, and then enter it into
evidence. '80
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court below by
holding the trial court abused its discretion, which warranted a new
trial.'8' The court reasoned:
"The adversary theory as it has prevailed for the past 200 years maintains
that the devotion of the participants, judge, juror and advocate, each to a
single function, leads to the fairest and most efficient resolution of the
dispute." The production of evidence is a function of the advocate and not
the judge or jury. Where, as here, the roles of advocate, judge or jury
become intermingled, the fundamental basis of our adversarial system is
undermined.1
2
' McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 645.
176 See id.
177 444 S.E.2d 515 (S.C. 2005).
... Day, 444 S.E.2d at 517.
179 Id.
180 Id.
'"' Id. at 519.
812 Id. at 517 (quoting Morrison v. State, 845 S.W. 2d 882, 885 (Tex. 1992)).
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The fact thatjurors ask or actually have answered an extensive number
of questions is not automatically determinative of whether they will be
deemed to have crossed the line from juror to advocate. In People v.
Garrison,"' jurors at trial submitted and possibly had answered over 450
written questions."' The defendant appealed arguing in part that the
jurors had "become investigators and advocates over the course of the
trial." '185 The court noted, however, that this case involved a ten-day
murder trial with six different charges, over thirty witnesses, and 170
exhibits.86 Accordingly, the court concluded that it was within the
discretion of the trial court whether to prohibit or limit the number of
juror questions.87
It is more laborious to require juror questions to be in writing than
allowing them to question witnesses orally and directly, but the
benefits-requiring jurors to take the additional time to phrase the
question as they wish; knowing precisely what the question is as opposed
to hearing it orally and possibly for the first time; and giving counsel the
opportunity to object outside the presence of the jury-are obvious.
These benefits are almost assuredly a large part of why oral questioning
is no longer permitted. 188 Two cases, however, show how this procedure
played a role in jurors impermissibly becoming advocates.
In State v. Jeffries,89 jurors directly examined an important witness
with about fifty questions that resulted in approximately fourteen
transcript pages.90 The court additionally allowed them to question other
witnesses, reflected in another twenty pages of transcript. 9 ' On appeal,
the court noted that "[m]any of the jurors' questions were prejudicial;
they were argumentative; some of them were outside of the issues and
showed that the jurors had become prejudiced against the appellant."'92
..3 303 P.3d 117 (Colo. App. 2012).
114 Garrison, 303 P.3d at 120 n.1.
185 Id. at 121.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.452, at Part I.
189 644 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
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Based thereon, the court reversed the defendant's conviction and found
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing this extensive juror
examination and that the "j]urors appeared to [have] take[n] the role of
advocates for the state in their examination of witnesses.193 If written
questions had been required, it is doubtful from a mechanical standpoint,
that page after page of transcript of juror examination ever could have
been generated.
Similarly, in Krause v. State,'94 the defendant's conviction was re-
versed where a juror interrogated him at length while he was on the wit-
ness stand, and "the record disclose[d] that [the juror] apparently thought
he was the county attorney and assumed the role of prosecutor."'195
Finally, one jury went far beyond advocacy, and was able to do
something that most trial attorneys would neither think of trying nor
achieve if they did, in Miller v. Commonwealth.'96 In this case from
1920, the jurors returned to the courtroom, after retiring to the jury room
to consider their verdict, and asked the court to recall a witness who
testified for the accused.'97 It is not noted whether either attorney
objected to this, although defense counsel certainly objected to two juror
questions asking whether counsel had sought to coerce the witness's
favorable testimony by saying that if she did not provide it her son would
be sent to the penitentiary.'98 The objections were overruled.9 9 In a
holding that has likely never been repeated on even remotely similar facts
in the ninety-four years since, the court said:
We do not find any objection to the course pursued by the trial judge in
permitting Sallie Ann Miller to be recalled and examined .... Any member
of the jury has the right, during the examination of a witness, to ask any
competent, pertinent question, and, after the jury has retired to consider their
verdict, they have the right to return to the courtroom and ask that a witness,
who has testified, be recalled if he is present or so convenient as to be
- Id. at 435.
194 132 P.2d 179, 180 (Crim. Ct. App. Okla. 1942).
'9' Krause, 132 P.2d at 182.
'96 222 S.W. 96, 98-99 (Ct. App. Ky. 1920).
1-7 Miller, 222 S.W. at 98-99.
19' Id. at 99.
199 Id.
[Vol. 38:1
JURORS' QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES AT TRIAL
quickly secured, and in the presence of the court, the parties to the case and
their attorneys ask the witness any pertinent, competent questions relating
to matter brought out on the examination of the witness. °°
C. As Indicated by Their Questions, Have Jurors
Jumped the Gun and Prejudged the Case?
It is axiomatic that jurors are told that they should wait until their
deliberations, after all the evidence has been presented and they have
heard closing argument and received their instructions, before discussing
the case among themselves, much less begin judging the case. Juror
questions, however, and even a single question, have raised issues on
whether this stricture has been violated. One such question was asked
by a juror in Biela v. State."1 There, the defendant was charged with
murder, sexual assault and kidnapping.2"2 After the jury saw a video
where the defendant mentioned that he attempted to purchase a gun the
week before the attack, a juror submitted a question, to which no
objection was made by either party, to be put to a detective.203 The ques-
tion was: "Do you have any thoughts on why [the defendant] would try
to buy a gun, if he already had one (as used with one of the victims)?
2 °0 4
The opinion does not reveal whether the detective ever answered the
question, or, if so, what he said.
The following day, the defendant moved for a mistrial "stating that
upon further reflection, we are concerned the question presupposes guilt
as to the sexual assault [charge]."2 5 The court held a hearing, where it
asked the juror who presented this question whether it indicated that she
prematurely decided defendant's guilt on this charge.20 6 She said no, and
the parties asked no follow-up questions.20 7
200 Id.
20' No. 56720, 2012 WL 3139876 (Nev. Aug. 1, 2012).
202 Biela, 2012 WL 3139876, at *1.
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The Nevada Supreme Court held that "the juror was simply requesting
factual information and not revealing a premature opinion""2 8 and that
"a proper question does not imply that a juror formed any opinion any
more than it does when a judge asks a question."2 9
D. What Have Juror Questions Prompted,
and to What Effect?
Juror questions are supposed to seek to elicit admissible evidence.
Otherwise, they should not be asked. Even when such is their purpose,
at least apparently, it is not always the case that the results end there.
And when they do not, not just issues but reversals may result. In State
v. Banko, the defendant was convicted of second-degree possession of
a weapon for an unlawful purpose.21° During trial, jurors presented
written questions that asked whether a pellet gun could kill someone and
for statistical information on the gun, such as velocity of the projectiles."'
The court told counsel that the jury would be provided "sufficient
information" to respond to these evidentiary concerns.1 2 Without ob-
jection, the court then instructed the jury that "some of these questions
maybe answered during the course of the trial, or during my instructions;
so we will hold these in abeyance. If they still need to be answered, you
will let us know."21 3  The next day, the prosecutor questioned the
defendant about these very matters."4 In doing so, as the court noted,
the prosecutor "succeeded in responding to the two main substantive
areas raised in the queries from the jury: (1) the lethal potential of the BB
20 Id. at *5.
209 Id. (citing Flores v. State, 965 P.2d 901, 903 (Nev. 1998)); People v. Garrison,
No. 08CA2637, 2012 WL 3517377, at *4 (Ct. App. Colo. Sept. 27, 2012) ("A juror
may form a bias about a piece of evidence or make a determination about the cred-
ibility of a witness over the course of a trial without necessarily violating a defendant's
rights.").
210 No. 99-12-2233, 2006 WL 3313634, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 16,
2006).
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gun, and (2) the gun's muzzle velocity.,215 The prosecutor's questions
apparently bothered the court: "[W]e consider the substantive questions
posed by the jury, and the insights gleaned by the prosecutor from those
questions, highly problematic.,21 6 The court went on to state:
[T]he juror questions regarding the BB gun here undoubtedly induced the
prosecutor to elicit new and very specific proof concerning the gun's ballistic
characteristics through her ensuing cross-examination f the defendant.
We have serious concerns about whether the jury questions in this case
unduly influenced the conduct of the trial. [The questions came] from the
jury, rather than from an individual juror, which indicates that the jurors had
improperly discussed the questions among themselves prior to their
deliberations. That is flatly contrary to [the instruction that they not discuss
the case among themselves] until the entire case has been concluded.
... We also recognize the absence of any timely objection from trial
counsel. Nevertheless, the apparent inquisitorial activism of the jury in the
conduct of this trial raises considerable doubts in our minds about the
fairness of the proceedings.... 2 17
Based on the above, as well as other prejudicial events at trial, the
defendant's conviction was reversed.1 8
This case creates a proverbial "Catch-22" for trial counsel. On the
one hand, they cannot realistically ignore juror questions and what they
may indicate about how their case is proceeding. And, neither should
they, for ifjurors are saying through their questions that they need more
information, this is of benefit both to counsel and the judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most informed verdicts. On the other hand,
however, if trial counsel reacts to the jurors' cues contained in their
questions by giving them (here, without dispute) admissible and highly
material evidence, they may face disapproval such as is found in this
opinion. With its holding, this court materially narrowed the path upon
which trial counsel must walk in terms of reacting--or not reacting-to
cues provided by jurors.
215 Id. at *4.
216 Id.
217 Id. at *5.
218 Id. at *17.
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In a scenario similar to the one in Banko, a juror's single question
about blood led to a reversal in Morrison v. State.219 The defendant was
convicted of murder after claiming at trial that he acted in self-defense,
with the struggle having taken place at least partially in the hallway of
the victim's home.22 Following testimony of the investigating detective,
a juror presented this question: "Was any of the blood in the hall [the
defendant's]?"'221 However, the defendant's hearsay objection was
sustained, and the question was never asked.222
The prosecutor claimed that he intended to ask the detective about the
defendant's physical well being on the night of the murder but "forgot,"
so he asked to recall him.223 The defendant objected and argued in part
that the juror's question stimulated this tactic and that the detective
already finished his testimony. 4 The objection was overruled, and the
detective testified that he had not observed any wounds, scratches, or
injuries on the defendant on the night of the murder.225
The issue framed on appeal was "should jurors be allowed to alert
counsel?"'226 The court first noted the statement in United States v.
Callahan227 that said, "If nothing else, the question should alert trial
counsel that aparticularfactual issue may need more xtensive develop-
ment.'228 What was expected and desirable in Callahan, however,
received a very different reception by the Morrison court:
What is bothersome.. . is the explicit acknowledgement [in Callahan] that
jurors should be allowed to alert counsel that additional evidence should
be introduced on a material fact.
The first admonition the court gives a jury after its selection is "Do not
talk to the lawyers." ... What could be more helpful to counsel-particularly
29 815 S.W.2d 766 (Ct. App. Tex. 1991).
220 Morrison, 815 S.W.2d at 766-67.






227 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979).
228 Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086 (emphasis added).
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to a prosecutor-than to hear firsthand from jurors during the trial the things
which concern them about the evidence? ... Essentially, the Callahan court
is encouraging communication between the jury and counsel during the trial,
a practice which undermines the court's admonition: "Do not talk to the
lawyers." Sanctioning this practice in a criminal case is particularly
troubling.
A procedure which would encourage jurors to communicate directly with
the prosecutor ... would be so patently and fundamentally unfair to the
defendant that even the most state's-oriented advocate could scarcely
condone it.
229
This decision does not seem to be well-reasoned. First, the juror's
question in this case was not only reasonable but highly material. Second,
his obvious purpose was to gather factual information to help him decide
whether defendant's self-defense claim had merit; if his blood was in fact
found in the hallway, this would have been strong evidence in support
of his claim. There is no reason for juror questioning at all if this purpose
is not permitted. Third, the juror was not "allowed" to alert counsel-the
alert was inherent in the question (which was a perfectly good question
to begin with). Taking the "alert" out of this question would nullify the
question ab initio. And, finally, the opinion makes no mention of there
being any impropriety where a juror's question "tipped off' the defense
and spurred it to take steps that might ultimately lead to acquittal. Under
this holding, trial counsel's path in response to juror questions asking for
factual information is almost unusable.
Finally, a single juror's question caused yet another conviction to be
reversed in an almost Perry Mason-like fashion, in Branch v. State.2 3°
The defendant claimed self-defense in his trial for murder and alleged
the deceased was chasing him brandishing a knife when the defendant
shot him.231 There was testimony, however, that the deceased did not
have a knife.2 32 A juror orally asked the defendant what happened to the
deceased's knife and whether it was ever found.2 3' The defendant tried
to explain that a woman "sent the knife 'up there' but was stopped
229 Morrison, 815 S.W.2d at 768.
230 469 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
231 Branch, 469 S.W.2d at 533.
232 Id. at 533-34.
233 Id. at 534.
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because of the hearsay nature of his statement.234 It is not clear from the
opinion that "up there" was identified at trial, but it certainly was in a
hearing upon defendant's motion for a new trial.2 3' The Assistant District
Attorney General stated that his case file "disclosed that an unidentified
colored man turned a knife into the police department... that they said
was found."236 As a result of this favorable evidence being withheld from
the defense, the conviction was reversed.237 If the juror had never asked
the question, there is no reason to believe that this would have occurred.
E. Trial Judges: How "Active" May They Be
in Response to Juror Questions?
Jurors' questions either require or may cause action, in some form,
from their trial judges. The following decisions provide guidelines for
how "active" a judge may be. The issue of whether the court could "lay
a foundation" arose in Trotter v. State.23 Preliminarily, because jurors
typically are not knowledgeable about evidentiary requirements, the
questions they present will rarely be accompanied by any necessary
predicate or foundational questions. If only admissible questions may
be approved by the court for presentation to the witness, this poses a
problem-who is to lay the foundation? One would think it would be
counsel, albeit with "prove-up" evidence after the juror's questions are
asked and answered. However, here it was the trial judge-and the
defendant, convicted of theft, appealed on this issue.
A juror submitted a written question "asking if the time of day
indications on the voided sales receipt and the videotape were con-
sistent."'239 This question was a logical follow-up to the already admitted
evidence that the time stamp on the former was different from the time




237 Id. at 536-37.
23" 733 N.E.2d 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
239 Trotter, 733 N.E.2d at 530.
240 Id.
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related to the defendant's alleged use of a stolen credit card to purchase
merchandise.24' Defense counsel objected on several grounds including
the foundational basis that the security guard on the stand was not a
proper witness to answer the question.42 The court overruled the objec-
tion and, in the presence of the jury, questioned the guard on whether he
was "familiar with the time stamping on the receipts. .. and the video-
tape," among other foundational matters.243 Trial counsel also questioned
him.244 Ultimately, the difference in times was explained by an electrical
storm that required the videotape system to be rebooted, which caused
a delay consistent with the difference.245
The court held that such questioning by the trial court "is permitted
if the court needs the requested information to rule intelligently on a
matter, as long as the questioning is done in an impartial manner and does
not influence the jury improperly with the judge's own contention," and
that "a trial court does not abuse its discretion by asking questions which
ultimately aid a party in laying a foundation for an exhibit.,
246
May the trial court alter a juror's question and then have it asked?
This issue arose in Sommers v. Friedman,247 with the answer, limited to
the facts, being "yes., 248 In this medical malpractice case, a juror
presented a question for a defense expert--"When a patient comes in with
potential aortic dissection, is it common to do more than one x- ray?249
The trial court thought the word "potential" was vague, and in order to
give the question "more significance or greater probative value," the trial
court altered the question and asked the witness: "When a patient comes
in with suspected aortic dissection... ?,,2" The plaintiff objected:
[B]ecause the question came from a juror, the jury would be aware of the





245 Id. at 530.
246 Id. at 532-33.
247 493 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
248 Sommers, 493 N.W.2d at 400-01.
249 Id. at 399.
250 id.
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itselfpersonally "believed that no additional x-rays were required unless [the
defendant] 'suspected' aortic dissection." Thus, says [the plaintiff], the test
of negligence was shifted from an objective standard to a subjective one-"if
[the defendant] did not suspect aortic dissection, no further x-rays were
necessary"-and that the error is all the more serious because "the trial court
itself obscured the standard."25'
The court disagreed stating that "it appears to us that, considered in the
context of the testimony leading up to the question, the trial court did not
err in making the alteration."252 Admittedly limited to these narrow facts,
this opinion does stand as authority for a trial court to alter a juror's
proffered question prior to it being asked of the witness.
Perhaps the most activist ofjudges, where juror questioning has been
involved on appeal, is found in Hinton v. United States.253 The defendant
was charged with possession of PCP, which officers said they found in
the sleeve area of a black jacket he was wearing.4 Both defendant and
other witnesses denied that he was wearing a jacket-rather, stating he
was wearing a sweatshirt.255 Thus, the issue of what he was wearing was
quite material. 6
After empanelment of the twelve-member jury, "Juror 8" submitted
nine questions to be put to the witnesses.2 7 Although not extremely clear
or precise, the questions were discernable."8 Most of them were asked
with no objection, and witnesses usually understood them without
trouble.259 Six ofthese questions focused on the primary issue of whether
defendant was in fact wearing a black jacket-and targeted the police
version.26°
On the fourth day of trial, the prosecutor told the court that he had
"'increasing concerns' about Juror 8's ability 'to communicate and
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 979 A.2d 663 (D.C. 2009) (en banc).
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effectively deliberate with other jurors."'26' The court commented that
Juror 8 "had been asking 'really off the wall questions that would indicate
that person has difficulty following the evidence in this case,"' and noted
"'pained' looks on other jurors' faces when [he] submitted a question.,262
The court also "expressed doubt about his 'level of intelligence.'
263
Defense counsel disagreed and stated, "Juror 8's questions were relevant
and 'insightful,' and objected to his removal from the jury.9
264
The next day, the trial court reopened the discussion about Juror 8,
indicating that it "did not 'read [his questions] as favoring the defense,'
but rather as being 'strange and bizarre' and difficult to comprehend or
answer."265 Defense counsel (properly) pointed out that "'because he
doesn't write well orhe doesn't seem to express his opinion on the paper
doesn't mean that he cannot express it verbally.' ' 266 The trial court
concluded that Juror 8's questions revealed "the extent to which he would
have difficulty serving in deliberation" and "demonstrated that this is a
hung jury waiting to happen because ... he doesn't think along the
wavelength of normal functioning people in my view. ' 267 Accordingly,
over objection, and without further2 61 inquiry of Juror 8, the trial court
removed him and replaced him with one of the alternate jurors.269 The
defendant appealed his conviction arguing "the trial court abused its
discretion and violated his rights under [Federal Rule of] Criminal
Procedure 24(c), because the juror was neither shown nor found to be
'unable or disqualified to perform juror duties.'' 270
The reader at this point has likely concluded some or all of the
following: (1) Juror 8 may have been one of the most focused jurors on
261 Id. at 669.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id. The trial court at this point had not raised the issue of his removal, but
defense counsel certainly knew "which way the wind was blowing." Id.
265 Hinton, 979 A.2d at 669.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 668.
261 "Further" is likely not the correct word, as the opinion does not reflect that there
was any inquiry of Juror 8 (or any other juror) regarding his questions. See Hinton, 979
A.2d at 668-70.
269 Hinton, 979 A.2d at 670.
271 Id.; see SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 24(c)(1) (2009).
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the panel; (2) the trial court was not correct in finding that his questions
did not favor the defense-although, even if true, this should not be a
reason to remove him; (3) there was no factual basis of any kind that
supported the trial court's action, merely its perceptions-and these
appear to be objectively incorrect; and (4) the real reason for his removal,
although never stated, was that he was at that point leaning toward the
defense.27'
The court, en banc, reversed the defendant's conviction, recognizing
what the trial court should have:
The judge expressly based her decision on the juror's written questions to
the witnesses. [However, Juror 8's] questions had a reasonable basis
in the evidence, and they were not objectionable. Indeed, they focused
intelligently on the central issue in dispute, the alleged connection between
[the defendant] and the jacket in which the arresting officers claimed to have
found PCP. The questions simply do not support a finding that Juror 8 was
unable to perform his duties as a juror.
Although we do not doubt that the judge acted in good faith, the removal
of a juror on account of his questions to witnesses comes perilously close
to removing a juror because of his views of the evidence-one of the
principal evils against which Rule 24(c)'s restrictions are directed. Indeed,
that was the essence of defense counsel's objection to the removal of Juror
8 [whom counsel perceived as receptive to his defense]. This is therefore
an area where a trial judge must proceed with great caution. Unless ajuror's
questions unmistakably reveal his incapacity, bias or other basis for dis-
qualification-for instance, because their total irrelevance to the trial or
incoherence indicate that thejuror is delusional or otherwise unable to follow
the proceedings-it is difficult to imagine that they could justify his removal.
We conclude that the trial court exercised its discretion erroneously in
this case by removing Juror 8 in violation of Criminal Rule 24(c).272
Conclusion
The apparent extent to which juror questioning is used is markedly
inconsistent with the extent to which it is authorized. This inconsistency
is unfortunate because, as this Article demonstrates, empirical studies
have verified the benefits ofjuror questioning. As much of the authoriza-
271 See Hinton, 979 A.2d at 670, 690-92.
272 Id. at 684-85
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tion nationwide allows juror questioning on a discretionary and not
mandatory basis, the perceptions and feelings ofjudges and trial attorneys
can, and in the case of the Ninth Circuit survey discussed herein273 do,
stand in the way of implementing this most worthwhile of trial innova-
tions. Strong statistical evidence exists showing that when judges and
attorneys use juror questioning their perceptions of this procedure change
for the better. However, it is doubtful that the benefits of this procedure
or the fact that experience with it changes perceptions for the better have
been adequately communicated to the bench and trial bar.
It appears that two efforts would materially help in overcoming this
reluctance. The first, likely more difficult to implement than the second,
would require states and circuits to move from being "discretionary" to
"mandatory" in regard to juror questioning. The second would consist
of a significant effort to educate both the bench and the trial bar with the
hope and expectation of turning those that are currently reluctant into
enthusiastic collaborators with a more active and participatory body of
American jurors. The result, already known through empirical testing,
would be well worth the effort.
273 See supra discussion at Part III.
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Appendix I
Federal and State Compendium Report:
Permissibility of Juror Questioning of Witnesses
§
Civil Criminal
(Mandatory/ Authority (Mandatory/ Authority
Discretlonary/ Discretionary/
Not Allowed) Not Allowed)
Federal 6 circuits 2 circuaits base permissibility 10 circuits 9 crits base Permissi-
Summtary discreItnary ons case law onl~y d' iscretionary bility on case law only
5 circuits 4 Circuits base permissibility I circuit has I circuit bases permnissi-
have not on jury instruactions and cast n ot ruled Su- bility op jury instructions
rusled law prene Court and case law
Supreme Shas not ruled
Court has not 4
ruled?
State 36 states dis- I1I states base permissibiity/ 37 states tlls- 17 states pennmissibility/
Summ9ary cretio)ry prohibition on case aw oSy ererionary proh bition based on Case
7 states man- 3.9 states base permissibility 3 states man-ls aw onl~y
datory on a statute or other sousrce atory 33 states base perij.si-
5 states do 9 states do bility on a statute or other
niot allow not allow source
I state
_________ ___________ unknown ____________
Supreme Has Not See Shackleford v. Champion, H as N ot See United States v. Witt,
Court Ruled 156 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. Ruled 215 F.2d 5 80 (2d Cir.),
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887
1150 (1999). (1954); United States v.
Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 826 (1979); United
States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 894 (1989).
First Has Not See United States v. Sutton, Discretionary United States v. Nivica,
Circuit Directly 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir. 887 F.2d 1110, 1123 (1st
Ruled 1992); United States v. Cir. 1989).
Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1123
(1st Cir. 1989) (holding juror
questioning of witnesses in a
criminal context is permissi-
ble within the discretion of
the judge). Although not spe-
cifically limited to criminal
trials, no direct authority
could be found that the prac-
tice is permissible in civil tri-
als in this circuit.
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Second Has Not See United States v. Witt, 215 Discretionary Witt, 215 F.2d at 584.
Circuit Directly F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1954)
Ruled (holding juror questioning of
witnesses in a criminal con-
text is permissible within the
discretion of the judge). Al-
though not specifically lim-
ited to criminal trials, no di-
rect authority could be found
that the practice is permissible
in civil trials in this circuit.
Third Discretionary Model Civil Jury Instructions Discretionary United States v. Hernan-
Circuit for the District Courts of the dez, 176 F.3d 719 (3d Cir.
Third Circuit, Instruction No. 1999).
1.8 (2011).
Fourth Discretionary DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Discretionary United States v. Polo-
Circuit Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d wichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413
512, 514 (4th Cir. 1985). (4th Cir. 1986).
Fifth Has Not See United States v. Callahan, Discretionary Callahan, 588 F.2d at
Circuit Directly 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1086.
Ruled 1979) (holding juror question-
ing of witnesses in a criminal
context is permissible within
the discretion of the judge).
As with other circuits, the
Fifth Circuit did not specifi-
cally limit its holding to crim-
inal trials, but no direct sup-
port could be found that the
practice is permissible in civil
trials in this circuit.
Sixth Has Not See United States v. Collins, Discretionary Collins, 226 F.3d at 464.
Circuit Directly 226 F.3d 457, 464 (6th Cir.
Ruled 2000) (holding juror question-
ing of witnesses in a criminal
context is permissible within
the discretion of the judge).
As with other circuits, the
Sixth Circuit did not specifi-
cally limit its holding to crim-
inal trials, but no direct sup-
port could be found that the
practice is permissible in civil
trials in this circuit.
Seventh Discretionary S.E.C. v. Koenig, 557 F.3d Discretionary United States v. Feinberg,
Circuit 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed- 89 F.3d 333, 337 (7th Cir.
eral Civil Jury Instructions of 1996).
the Seventh Circuit, Instruc-
tion Appendix: Sample Pre-
liminary Instructions (2010).
Eighth Discretionary 8th Cir. Civil Jury Instr. § Discretionary United States v. Land, 877
Circuit 1.07 (2013). F.2d 17 (8th Cir. 1989);
FED. CRIM-JI8C 1.06B,
Model Crim. Jury Instr. 8th
Cir. 1.06B (2011).
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Ninth Discretionary Manual of Model Civil Jury Discretionary United States v. Huebner,
Circuit Instructions for the District 48 F.3d 376 (9th Cir.
Courts of the Ninth Circuit, 1994).
Instruction 1.15 (2007).
Tenth Discretionary Willner v. Soares, 57 F. Has Not See Willner, 57 F. App'x at
Circuit App'x 848, 851 (10th Cir. Directly 851 (noting the practice of
2003). Ruled juror questioning witnesses
has never been prohibited
in federal courts and thus
found no error in allowing
the practice in the case di-
rectly at hand). Although
the court did not specifi-
cally limit its holding to
civil trials, no direct au-
thority could be found that
the practice is permissible
in criminal trials in the
Tenth Circuit.
Eleventh Has Not See United States v. Richard- Discretionary Richardson, 233 F.3d at
Circuit Directly son, 233 F.3d 1285, 1290-91 1290-91.
Ruled (11th Cir. 2000) (holding ju-
ror questioning of witnesses
in a criminal context is per-
missible within the discretion
of the judge). As with other
circuits, the Eleventh Circuit
did not specifically limit its
holding to criminal trials, but
no direct authority could be
found that the practice is per-
missible in civil trials in this
circuit.
Alabama Discretionary Prather v. Nashville Bridge Discretionary Exparte Malone, 12 So. 3d
Co., 236 So. 2d 322, 324 60, 65 (Ala. 2008).
(Ala. 1970).
Alaska Discretionary Alaska Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. Discretionary Landt v. State, 87 P.3d 73,
1.12. 80 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
Arizona Mandatory ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10) Mandatory ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.6(e)
(1995). (2009).
Arkansas Discretionary Ratton v. Busby, 326 S.W.2d Not Allowed ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.8
889, 894 (Ark. 1959). (2007).
California Discretionary Cal. R. of Ct. 2.1033. Discretionary Cal. R. of Ct. 2.1033.
Colorado Mandatory COLO. R. CIV. P. 47(u). Mandatory COLO. R. CRIM. P. 24(g).
Connecti- Discretionary Conn. R. Super. Ct. Civ. § 16- Discretionary Conn. R. Super. Ct. Crim.
cut 7. § 42-9.
Delaware Not Allowed GREGORY E. M IZE ET AL., THE
STATE-OF-THE-STATES SUR-
VEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT
EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM
REPORT 85 (2007). According
to the survey, zero percent of
the Delaware respondents
stated juror questioning of
Not Allowed MIZE ET AL., supra.
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witnesses was allowed, with
no specific reference to either
the civil or criminal setting.
Id. However, no case law,
rules of procedure, statutory
or other direct authority was
offered or found to support
this proposition.
Florida Mandatory FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.452. Discretionary FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.371.
Georgia Discretionary Steele v. Atlanta Maternal- Discretionary Story v. State, 278 S.E.2d
Fetal Medicine, P.C., 610 97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981);
S.E.2d 546 (Ga. Ct. App. Ga. Practice Handbook §
2005) (overruled on other 18:75; Ga. R. Unified Ap-
grounds). peal Part II.
Hawaii Discretionary HAW. R. CIV. P. 47(c). Discretionary HAW. R. PENAL. P. 26(b).
Idaho Discretionary IDAHO R. CIV. P. 47(q). Discretionary IDAHO CRIM. R. 30.1.
Discretionary Ill. S. Ct. R. Civ. P. 243. Discretionary In Chicago Hansom Cab
Co. v. Havelick, 131 11.
179 (1889), juror question-
ing of witnesses did not
constitute reversible error.
Although decided in the
civil context, the court did
not explicitly limit its hold-
ing to civil trials. Id. Based
on Havelick, it is likely the
state would allow jurors to
submit questions to wit-
nesses in the criminal con-
text. However, unlike Illi-
nois Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 243, no Rule of
Criminal Procedure was
found. See also MIZE ET
AL., supra. Zero percent of
Illinois respondents stated
juror questioning of wit-
nesses was allowed, refer-
encing criminal settings.






case law, rules of proce-
dure, statutory or other di-
rect authority was offered
or found to support this.
Indiana Discretionary IND. R. EVID. 614(d) (1994); Discretionary IND. R. EVID. 614(d)
IND. JURY R. 20(a)(7) 22A; (1994).
Ind. Prac., Civ. Trial Prac. §
30.24; 30 Ind. Law. Encyc. §
72.
Iowa Discretionary Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Discretionary State v. Buchanan, 800
Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 553 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Iowa Ct.
(Iowa 1980). App. 2011).
Illinois
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Kansas Discretionary Rood v. Kansas City Power & Discretionary State v. Hays, 883 P.2d
Light Co., 755 P.2d 502, 505 1093, 1097 (Kan. 1994).
(Kan. 1988).
Kentucky Discretionary KY. R. EVID. 614(c). Discretionary KY. R. EVID. 614(c).
Louisiana Not Allowed M IZE ET AL., supra. Zero per- Not Allowed MIZE ET AL., supra.
cent of Louisiana respondents
stated juror questioning of
witnesses was allowed, refer-
encing both the civil and
criminal settings, however no
direct authority was found or





State.aspx. See State v. John-
son, 458 So. 2d 539, 544 (La.
Ct. App. 1984) (the court in a
criminal case specifically
chose not to rule on the issue
as objection to the procedure
had not been properly pre-
served at trial).
Maine Not Allowed Traverse Juror Handbook, Not Allowed Traverse Juror Handbook,
State of Maine Superior Court State of Maine Superior
(2009). Court (2009).
Maryland Discretionary See Handy v. State, 30 A.3d Discretionary Handy, 30 A.3d at 218.
197, 218 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2011 ) (permitting juror ques-
tioning of witnesses at the
discretion of the court in
criminal trial and allowing the
presumption that the holding
is applicable to civil trials).
Additionally, as the court
based its decision in part on
Maryland Rule of Procedure
4-326, it is likely that the
practice would be allowed on
a discretionary basis in civil
trials, although no authority
has been found to directly
support this proposition. See
id; see also M IZE ET AL., su-
pra. Just over nine percent of
Maryland respondents stated
juror questioning of witnesses
was allowed, referencing civil
and criminal settings. Id.; see
Judge and Attorney Survey:




Massachu- Discretionary MASS. R. EVID. 614(d). Discretionary MASS. R. EVID. 614(d).
setts
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Michigan Discretionary MICH. R. CIV. P. 2.513(1). Discretionary People v. Heard, 200
N.W.2d 73, 75 (Mich.
1972).
Minnesota Discretionary See State v. Costello, 646 Not Allowed M INN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03
N.W.2d 204, 214 (Minn. (Subd. 16. Evidence);
2002) (holding juror question- MINN. R. EVID. 614(d).
ing of witnesses was not al-
lowed in criminal trials and
implying the practice remains
discretionary in a civil set-
ting); see also MIZE ET AL.,
supra. Almost three percent
of Minnesota respondents
stated juror questioning of
witnesses was allowed in civil
trials, although not allowed in
criminal trials. Id.; see Judge
& Attorney Survey: Minne-




Missis- Not Allowed See Wharton v. State, 734 So. Not Allowed Wharton, 734 So. 2d at 990
sippi 2d 985, 990 (Miss. 1998) ("Today we hold that juror
(holding juror questioning of interrogation is no longer
witnesses is impermissible in left to the discretion of the
a criminal trial and allowing trial court, but rather is a
the presumption that the hold- practice that is condemned
ing is applicable to civil tri- and outright forbidden by
als); see also MIZE ET AL., this Court.").
supra. Zero percent of Missis-
sippi respondents state juror
questioning of witnesses was
allowed, referencing both
civil and criminal trials. Id.;
see Judge & Attorney Survey:




Missouri Discretionary MO. SUP. CT. R. Civ. P. 69.04. Discretionary State v. Sickles, 286 S.W.
432, 433 (Mo. Ct. App.
1926).
Discretionary See State v. Graves, 907 P.2d
963, 966-67 (Mont. 1995)
(permitting juror questioning
of witnesses at the discretion
of the court in a criminal trial
and allowing the presumption
that the holding is applicable
to civil trials). Further, the
court based its decision in part
of Montana Rule of Evidence
61 l(a)(l), thus supporting the
inference that the practice
would be discretionary in a
civil setting. See also MIZE ET
Discretionary Graves, 907 P.2d at 965-
67.
Montana
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AL., supra. Six percent of
Montana respondents stated
juror questioning of witnesses
was allowed in both civil and
criminal trials. Id.; see Judge





Nebraska Not Allowed 1 Neb. Prac., NJl2d Civ. 1.00 Not Allowed State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d
(2012-2013 ed.). 377, 380 (Neb. 1991).
Nevada Mandatory Nev. Short Trial R. 24. Mandatory Flores v. State, 965 P.2d
910, 913 (Nev. 1998); Nev.
Short Trial R. 24.
New Discretionary N.H. R. of Super. Ct. 64-B. Discretionary N.H. R. of Super. Ct. 64-B.
Hamp-
shire
New Discretionary N.J. R. of Ct. 1:8-8. Not Allowed State v. Jumpp, 619 A.2d
Jersey 602, 613 (N.J. App. 1993).
New Discretionary NMRA, Civ. UJI 13-112. Discretionary NMRA, Crim. UJI 14-101.
Mexico
New York Discretionary Sitrin Bros., Inc. v. Deluxe Discretionary People v. Knapper, 230
Lines, Inc., 231 N.Y.S.2d A.D. 487, 492 (N.Y. App.
943, 946 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Div. 1930).
1962).
North Discretionary See State v. Kendall, 57 S.E. Discretionary Kendall, 57 S.E. at 341.
Carolina 340, 341 (N.C. 1907) (permit-
ting juror questioning of wit-
nesses at the discretion of the
court in a criminal trial and
allowing the presumption that
the holding is applicable to
civil trials).
North Discretionary N.D. R. Ct. 6.8. Unknown MIZE ET AL., supra. Three




only civil trials. Id.; see
Judge & Attorney Survey:




by-State.aspx. No case law,
rules of procedure, statu-
tory or other direct author-
ity was offered or found as
to the permissibility ofju-
ror questioning in criminal
trials in the state.
Ohio Discretionary OHIO. CIV. R. 47(F). Discretionary OHIO CRIM. R. 24(J).
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Oklahoma Discretionary White v. Little, 268 P. 221, Discretionary Krause v. State, 132 P.2d
222 (Okla. 1928). 179, 182 (Okla. Crim. App.
1942).
Oregon Discretionary OR. R. CIV. P. 58. Discretionary OR. REV. STAT. § 136.330
(2007).
Pennsyl- Discretionary Boggs v. Jewell Tea Co., 109 Discretionary See Boggs, 109 A. at 668
vania A. 666, 668 (Penn. 1920). (allowing juror questioning
of witnesses in civil trials
and leaving open the infer-
ence that the practice is
additionally discretionary
in criminal trials); see also
MIZE ET AL., supra. Less
than one percent of
Pennsylvania respondents
stated juror questioning of
witnesses was allowed in
both civil and criminal tri-






authority was offered or
found to support the propo-
sition in regard to criminal
trials.
Rhode Discretionary According to a phone conver- Discretionary MIZE ET AL., supra.
Island sation with a librarian from
the Rhode Island State Law
Library, the practice of juror
questioning of witnesses
would be allowed in both civil
and criminal trials under
Rhode Island Rule of Evi-
dence 611, which grants the
court control over the mode
and order of interrogating wit-
nesses. However, this rule
does not explicitly state that
juror questioning of witnesses
is allowed in either civil or
criminal trials, and no addi-
tional direct authority was
found to support this proposi-
tion. See also MIZE ET AL.,
supra. Nearly five percent of
Rhode Island respondents
stated juror questioning of
witnesses was allowed in both
civil and criminal trials. Id.;
see Judge & Attorney Survey:
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South Discretionary Day v. Kilgore, 444 S.E.2d Discretionary State v. Barrett, 297 S.E.2d
Carolina 515, 518 (S.C. 1994). 794, 796 (S.C. 1982).
South Discretionary MIZE ET AL., supra. Twelve Discretionary MIZE ET AL., supra.
Dakota percent of South Dakota re-
spondents stated juror ques-
tioning of witnesses was al-
lowed in both civil and crimi-
nal trials. Id.; see Judge &
Attorney Survey: South Da-




ever, no case law, rules of
procedure, statutory or other
direct authority was offered or
found to support this proposi-
tion.
Tennessee Discretionary TENN. R. CIV. P. 43A.03. Discretionary TENN. R. CRIM. P. 24.1(c).
Texas Mandatory S.B. 297, 2011 82d Leg. (Tex. Not Allowed Morrison v. State, 845
2011); TEX. PRACTICE GUIDE: S.W.2d 882,889 (Tex.
CIV. TRIAL § 7:263. Crim. App. 1992).
Utah Discretionary UTAH R. CIv. P. 47. Discretionary UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(i).
Vermont Discretionary Buker v. King, No.523-1I- Discretionary State v. Doleszny, 844
05, 2009 WL 5454432 A.2d 773, 786-87 (Vt.
(Super. Ct. Vt. Aug. 5, 2009). 2004).
Virginia Discretionary See Williams v. Common- Discretionary Williams, 484 S.E.2d at
wealth, 484 S.E.2d 153, 155 155; Va. Practice Series §
(Va. App. 1997) (permitting 2:20.
juror questioning of witnesses
at the discretion of the court
in a criminal trial and allow-
ing the presumption that the
holding is applicable to civil
trials); Snead v. Va. Elec. &
Power Co., 17 Va. Cir. 534
(Va. Cir. Ct. 1978) (noting
"unrestricted questioning by
the jury was unwise" but not
specifying whether the prac-
tice was allowed or prohibi-
ted). Based on Snead, it is
likely the practice would be
found discretionary in civil
trials.
Washing- Mandatory WPI 1.01; Wash. Super. Ct. Discretionary State v. Munoz, 837 P.2d
ton Civ. R. 43(k); Wash. R. Civ. 636, 639 (Wash. App.
Ltd Juris. 43. 1992); WPIC 4.166 5A




Discretionary According to a phone conver-
sation with a librarian from
the West Virginia State Law
Library, the practice of juror
questioning of witnesses
Discretionary MIZE ET AL., supra.
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would likely be allowed in
both civil and criminal trials
under West Virginia Rule of
Evidence 611, which grants
the court control over the
mode and order of interrogat-
ing witnesses. However, this
rule does not explicitly state
juror questioning of witnesses
is allowed in either civil or
criminal trials, and no author-
ity was found to support this
proposition. See also MIZE ET
AL., supra. Two percent of
West Virginia respondents
stated juror questioning of
witnesses was allowed in only
civil settings. Id.; see Judge &
Attorney Survey: West Vir-




Wisconsin Discretionary Sommers v. Friedman, 493 Discretionary Toliver v. McCaughtry,
N.W.2d 393, 400 (Wis. Ct. 910 F.Supp. 1366, 1372
App. 2008). (E.D. Wis. 1995).
Wyoming Mandatory WYO. R. CIV. P. 39.4. Discretionary Cathcart v. State Farm Mu-
tual Auto Ins. Co., 123
P.3d 579, 594-95 (Wyo.
2005) ("Wyoming is
among the majority of
states that allow juror ques-
tioning" without specific
limitation to civil setting.);
see also MIZE ET AL., su-
pra. Thirty-four percent of
Wyoming respondents
stated that juror question-
ing of witnesses was al-
lowed, referencing both
civil and criminal settings.





by-State.aspx. No case law,
rules of procedure, statu-
tory or other direct author-
ity was offered or found,
aside from Cathcart, to
support this proposition in
criminal trials.
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Appendix II
Florida Ninth Judicial Circuit Judges Survey
(52 Total Responses Received)
Overview
Of the 52judges who responded to the survey, 28 (54%) have presided
over criminal jury trials since the Rules of Criminal Procedure were
changed to allow juror questioning of witnesses [Question 1].
Of those 28 judges who have presided over criminal jury trials since
the Rules of Criminal Procedure were changed, only 6 (21%) have
allowed jurors to ask questions, 11 (39%) have not allowed juror ques-
tioning of witnesses, and 11 did not respond [Question 2a].
Fourteen of the 17 judges (82%) stated that the prosecution has never
asked to allow juror questioning ofwitnesses; the remaining 3 (18%) said
that prosecutors asked to allow the process anywhere from 1% to 60%
of the time [Question 2e]. Thirteen of 17 (76%) stated that he defense
attorneys never asked to allow juror questioning of witnesses, with the
remaining 4 (24%) stating that defense asked to allow the process from
1 to 50% of the time [Question 2f].
Of the 52 judges who responded to the survey, only 7 (13.5%) have
presided over civil jury trials since jurors have been allowed to question
witnesses; 33 (63.5%) have not; 12 (23%) did not respond [Question 3].
Of those 7 who have presided over civil jury trials since juror ques-
tioning of witnesses has been allowed, only 6 responded to the follow
up questions 4a-k. Of those 6, 100% have allowed jurors to ask questions
in trial [Question 4a]. Those 6 allowed questioning in 75 to 100% of their
trials [Question 4b].
According to the judges who responded, both plaintiffs and defendants
have asked to allow juror questioning of witnesses, but the frequency of
such requests has ranged from 20 to 100% of the time. Only 1 judge
stated that neither plaintiffs nor defendants have asked to allow juror
questioning of witnesses [Questions 4e & 4f].
Of the 52 judges who responded, 6 said thatjurors' questions focused
on material issues not sufficiently covered by attorneys' questions. Those
questions focused on these issues anywhere from 10 to 80% of the time
[Question 5a].
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Of the 52 judges who responded, 6 additionally said that attorneys
discernibly altered their tactics or arguments based on jurors' questions,
ranging anywhere from asking follow up questions or asking subsequent
witnesses questions seemingly in response to jurors' questions or
referencing the answer to jurors' question in closing statements [Ques-
tions 5c & 5d].
JURORS' QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES AT TRIAL
Appendix III
Florida Ninth Judicial Circuit
State Attorneys Survey
(41 Total Responses Received)
Overview
Of the 41 state attorneys who responded to the survey, 39 (95%) said
that they have never asked the court to allow jurors to ask questions of
witnesses as part of the trial process; only 2 (5%) asked the court to allow
them, and only in a very small percentage or approximately 5% of cases
[Question 1].
Of the 41 state attorneys who responded to the survey, 27 (66%) said
that the defense has never asked the court to allow jurors to ask questions
of witnesses as part of the trial process; only 1 (2%) of the state attorneys
had had the defense request that questions be allowed, and then only 5%
of the time; 2 (5%) of the state attorneys have had the defense request
that questions be allowed more often in recent years, up to 50% of the
time [Question 8].
An equal number of state attorneys, 19 out of the 41 (46.5%), par-
ticipated in trials that allowed jurors to question witnesses, as those that
had not (19 out 41-46.5%) [Question 12].
In those trials where jurors were allowed to question witnesses,
anywhere from 1 to every witness was questioned [Question 13]; and
included eye witnesses, experts, defendant, victim, and even the victim's
family [Question 14].
Six out of 41 state attorneys saw attorneys alter their tactics or
arguments in response to juror questions [Question 16]. Of those who
had altered their tactics, the success of altering those tactics was mixed
from "hard to say" to "very successful" [Question 18].
Fourteen out of 41 (34%) state attorneys said that they had not
discerned witnesses being either more truthful or testifying with greater
candor, in responding to jurors' questions; with the remaining 27 not
answering the question [Question 23].
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Appendix IV
Florida Ninth Judicial Circuit
Public Defenders Survey
(11 Total Responses Received)
Overview
Of the 11 public defenders who responded to the survey, all 11 (100%)
said that they have never asked the court to allow jurors to ask questions
of witnesses as part of the trial process [Question 1].
Of the 11 public defenders who responded to the survey, 6 (55%) said
that the prosecution has never asked the court to allow jurors to ask
questions of witnesses as part of the trial process; only 1 (9%) of the
public defenders had had the prosecution request that questions be
allowed, and then only 1% of the time; 4 did not respond to this question
[Question 8].
Six out of the 11 (55%) of the public defenders who responded had
participated in trials that allowed jurors to question witnesses, as
compared to 5 of 11 (45%) who had not [Question 12].
In those trials where jurors were allowed to question witnesses,
anywhere from 0 to 80% of witnesses were questioned [Question 13];
and included eye witnesses, crime scene investigators, detectives, victims,
victim's family [Question 14].
Only 2 out of 11 public defenders had seen attorneys alter their tactics
or arguments in response to juror questions [Question 16]. Of those who
had altered their tactics, the success of altering those tactics was mixed
from "not particularly" to "extremely" [Question 18].
Only 3 out of 11 (27%) public defenders said that they had not
discerned witnesses being either more truthful or testifying with greater
candor, in responding to jurors' questions; with the remaining 8 not
answering the question [Question 23].
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